Dirty debt

Rich countries share responsibility for Indonesia's impossible debt burden Ann Pettifor On a wet London afternoon in October 2001, a small delegation of campaigners from Indonesia, Britain and Germany made their way to the British Treasury to meet the British Chancellor's deputy, Mr Paul Boateng. The purpose of the meeting was to pressure the British government to cancel military debts owed by Indonesia to Britain. The delegation's eyes were on April 2002, when Indonesian representatives will meet the cartel of international creditors known as the Paris Club, which gathers in the French Treasury. Britain will be at the table with other powerful creditors, including Japan, the US and Germany. million of Indonesia's debt to Britain - a total of more than billion - consists of loans made by the British government and companies to a government the British had publicly criticised, but privately financed and armed - the Suharto government. The military debt is perhaps the most offensive part of this bigger problem. Inside the formal setting of the British Treasury, Binny Buchori of the Indonesian NGO Forum on Indonesia Development (Infid) made a passionate appeal for the cancellation of Indonesia's debt, particularly the military component. 'This debt is being paid by millions of ordinary Indonesians', she said. 'Many of them are very poor, and most of them ignorant that Suharto's government has left each person - whether they be mothers, fathers, grandparents, their children and grandchildren - with a very heavy burden of public debt. These people are each sacrificing their basic human rights to a decent standard of living, so that Indonesia's public debt of US$ 152 billion can be repaid.' Sugeng Bahagijo, also of Infid, added: 'Already the Indonesian government spends much, much more on paying foreign creditors than it spends on clean water, health, housing and education for its own people. The government is forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prioritise repayment to rich countries and banks over payments for schools, health and a better environment for the people of Indonesia.' The British delegates at the meeting argued that ordinary people in Britain had not agreed that their taxes should be used to guarantee loans for military exports to Suharto's regime. 'It was British Scorpion tanks that attacked students and protesters who stood up to Suharto in 1998. It was British Hawk jets that were used in East Timor,' said the British delegate. 'British people were not consulted about those loans, that were made in their name, and with their taxes. Instead the loans were made to Suharto in secret. We are now, as part of the Jubilee movement, calling on the British government to cancel those odious debts.' This meeting, which did not make the media headlines, is but one example of the way in which campaigners from north and south are working together, under the banner of Jubilee Movement International, to challenge an international financial system designed to profit those with money - creditors, speculators and bankers. A system which extracts and transfers resources from south to north. A system which goes by the name of 'globalisation' and which prioritises money rights over human rights. The poor of Indonesia, like the poor of many countries, are the victims of this system. Some 160 million Indonesians, 70% of them in rural areas, live below the international poverty line of US$2 a day. The World Bank estimates that between 1997 and 1998 the real wages of agricultural workers fell by as much as 40%, and those in urban areas fell by 34%. Since 1997, it is said, 39 million Indonesians have lost their jobs. Government funds that should be used to help re-build economic stability in Indonesia, and support the poor, are instead being used to repay foreign creditors. Before 1997, 40% of the government's budget was spent on human development. Since 1997 that spending has been cut by a third. Today, domestic and external debt service expenditure uses up 41% of the budget, and 61% of tax revenues. The IMF has played a key role in increasing Indonesia's foreign and domestic indebtedness. The institution is dominated by rich country OECD governments, like the US, the UK and Japan, who are its biggest shareholders. Most IMF policies are designed to promote their interests, and the interests of investors, creditors and speculators based in those countries. The IMF also acts as the gatekeeper for access to international finance and capital. So for Indonesia to be able to borrow on the international capital markets, or indeed for Indonesia to be able to obtain aid from OECD countries, it must first gain the approval of the IMF. Compensate The IMF itself has acknowledged it made a mistake when a small IMF staff team, after just two weeks in Jakarta, forced the Bank of Indonesia to close sixteen banks on 1 November 1997. The cost of that blunder is the larger part of Indonesia's huge domestic debt burden of $80 billion. Before this debacle in 1997, Indonesia did not have a significant domestic debt burden. We in Jubilee 2000 have a healthy respect for the market and agree that in some areas of the economy the market responds more democratically to consumer demands than say, state-backed companies. The IMF should take full responsibility for its error, and compensate the people of Indonesia for the full amount of the liabilities incurred through the banking debacle, by paying off the domestic debt that resulted from their blunder. The purpose of such compensation must be twofold: first to compensate and support the poor of Indonesia, and second to prevent future perverse errors by the IMF. IMF policies to increase taxes on fuel are a classic example of 'one-size-fits-all' policy errors which do not respond to, nor are accountable to market or indeed democratic forces. But the rise in fuel prices is also a device by the IMF to quickly raise funds for the Indonesian budget. These funds in turn are used to prioritise debt repayments to domestic and foreign creditors. There is no doubt that this policy could destabilise the government of Indonesia, and result in the defeat of democracy. Former President Wahid's government understood this well, and proposed an alternative to the sudden removal of fuel subsidies. The elected cabinet wanted to introduce taxes on the rich, conscious that very few Indonesians pay taxes. IMF staff resisted, arguing that Indonesia needs a 'quick fix' to raise funds for the budget, and that these funds are better raised through removing subsidies on fuel. The Minister of Finance, Mr Ramli, defied the IMF by asserting, informally and in public, that he intended to round up non-taxpayers. The effect of his announcement was that 600,000 Indonesians immediately signed up to pay their taxes. The government was confident that with more stringent sanctions far more tax avoiders could be persuaded to pay, and much more money could be raised. However, when a country is indebted, the diktats of unelected IMF officials (representing foreign creditors) take precedence over the democratic decisions of Indonesian politicians Because of the secrecy that surrounds IMF/ World Bank and Indonesian government negotiations, ordinary Indonesians are ignorant of what is being done in their name, and of the high costs associated with the economic policies imposed by foreign creditors. Indonesia's foreign and domestic debts remain, effectively, a state secret. Only when debate is opened up around the debt, and only when both the borrower (the Indonesian government) and the lenders are open and accountable for the public debts they incur, can we hope to introduce some discipline into the system, and control the spiralling rate of indebtedness. Only when money rights are once again subordinated to human rights, can we hope for peace, justice and an end to poverty in Indonesia. Ann Pettifor (apettifor.jubilee@neweconomics.org) is Programme Coordinator with Jubilee Plus (www.jubileeplus.org) at the New Economics Foundation. Inside Indonesia 69: Jan - Mar 2002

Peace on the net

A guide to resources for peace-makers Jane McGrory Peace movements find a natural ally in the internet. The global reach of the world wide web provides a clear advantage in rallying public opinion. The Nobel Prize-winning coalition for the ban on anti-personnel landmines, for example, relied heavily on the internet to create a global 'virtual' network of organisations. The East Timorese solidarity movement also made extensive use of the internet. But when it comes to using the internet as a tool for peace in Indonesia, a 'digital divide' is soon evident. International organisations take the lead. Local Indonesian initiatives to exploit the potential of the internet are only slowing taking shape. The prize internet site in the field of conflict prevention in Indonesia is a portal operated by the Harvard Peace Initiative (www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/portalhome.php). It includes daily news highlights, as well as links to in-depth articles and the Initiative's own background analysis. Its broad perspective of conflict-related issues - or 'human security precursors'- makes a valuable contribution in promoting understanding of the causes and potential for conflict and peace in Indonesia. A number of useful sites track developments in conflict situations. Among them are the UN's ReliefWeb news service (http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf), and the country reports produced by USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives (www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/country/indones/index.html). Excellent monthly newsletters compiling international reporting on conflict issues and threats to ethnic/ religious minorities can be found on the Prevent Genocide International site (www.preventgenocide.org). While largely pulling material from mainstream international media sources, the broad perspective of the screening process guarantees interesting reading. Another initiative highlighting the plight of threatened minority groups is the Minorities at Risk Project (www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar). Its Indonesian section looks at the situation facing ethnic Chinese, East Timorese, Papuans and Acehnese. If you are looking for information on the work of international organisations to build peace in Indonesia, try the Indonesian sections of sites for Search for Common Ground (www.searchforcommonground.org/locations.cfm?locus=Indonesia), Mercy Corp (www.mercycorps.org), www.mercycorps.org/) Catholic Relief Services www.catholicrelief.org/what/overseas/peace/index.cfm), Pact Worldwide (pactworld.org/Global/Indonesia_Discuss.html) and the British Council (http://www.britishcouncil.or.id/governance/index.htm). Or, visit the UNDP's unit for conflict prevention and recovery (//www.undp.or.id/cdu/index.html). The Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace (www.apcjp.org/) introduces research on conflict-related issues in Indonesia and the region. A good set of links can be found in the country guide on Ulster University's Incore site (//www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/indonesia.html) - as well as a wealth of information on peace practice worldwide. Another good links page is the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (//www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/links-e.htm). The Conflict Resolution Information Service (www.crinfo.org/) also offers broad range of resources on conflict and conflict transition. A search for Indonesian material produces a number of interesting links - and the other theme-based sections provide countless opportunities for good browsing. The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (www.fewer.org) site provides links to current conflict research and a risk assessment for Indonesia. The Indonesia project site of the International Crisis Group (www.crisisweb.org/projects/project.cfm?subtypeid=7) highlights relevant news items and offers high-quality research reports of key security issues. A keyword search on the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (www.ccpdc.org/) will also turn up some interesting material. Indonesian groups To find Indonesian groups working for conflict prevention, try the listing at the Asia-Pacific Directory site of the Japan Centre for Preventative Diplomacy (www.conflict-prevention.org). Or visit http://www.lsm.or.id //www.lsm.or.id, an excellent Indonesian non-government organisations (NGOs) networking site. The latter does not have a specific category for groups working on conflict issues, but the advocacy section should provide some leads to organisations working on issues of peace, justice, anti-discrimination, among others. In addition to those listed on the LSM site, try Aksara (www.aksara.org) and Yappika (www.yappika.org). Also, Gadjah Mada University's Centre for Security and Peace Studies (//www.csps-ugm.or.id/) maintains a good site introducing its research and programming work. Or visit the site of Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Perdamaian at Duta Wacana University (//www.ukdw.ac.id/lpip/pspp/index.html) and its sister-site on peacebuilding (www.empoweringforreconciliation.org). All of these Indonesian sites are bi-lingual. Looking for something more interactive? The Dialogue Webpage for Conflicts Worldwide (www.dwcw.org) hosts an on-line forum on conflict in various global hot-spots - including Indonesia. The Conflict Prevention Initiative runs an under-utilised on-line forum on Papua (www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/portalhome.php). And to stay up-to-date, you can join the Indonesian peacebuilding listserve by sending an email (with 'subscribe' in the subject line) to peacebuilding-subscribe@topica.com. Jane McGrory (janemcgr@telkom.net) is a consultant with Catholic Relief Service in Yogya Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

In this issue

Give peace a chance Gerry van Klinken When Herb Feith died suddenly on 15 November last year, the small group of people most closely involved with Inside Indonesia magazine immediately decided they wanted to honour him in the next edition. The theme was to be 'peace and international collaboration', the two leading ideas of Herb's later years. And here it is! For those readers who did not know Herb personally, we hope this edition will be a fitting if belated introduction to a remarkable pioneer of friendship with Indonesians. If it produced a flood of new enquiries to Australian Volunteers International from adventurous souls we would be especially pleased! Many people are talking about the need for peace in Indonesia. Including the Indonesian military, who display banners everywhere proclaiming: 'Peace is beautiful'. It is of course. However, if I am not mistaken there is a hidden message in these banners. It is that too many people are not peaceful, and we still need the military to keep the peace between them. That is certainly the message behind the upgrading of the TNI military command in war-torn Aceh last February. A security-oriented message ignores a persistent record of human rights abuse by the military themselves. Peace enforced by abusing human rights is no peace at all. Indeed, not just the military are an obstacle to peace. The state as a whole remains undemocratic in too many ways. It has a troubled history, going back to colonial times, of deeply deforming local communities. The conflicts we have seen in Indonesia since the end of the New Order have a lot to do with this disturbing history. Giving peace a chance does not mean returning to New Order militarism. It means democracy and human rights, from the centre to the remotest region. And it means trusting local communities to rediscover their own identity. Our thanks to all those who keep making Inside Indonesia possible, not least those who volunteer behind the scenes even during the long vacation. Gerry van Klinken is the Editor of Inside Indonesia Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

A syncretistic Jew

Learning from Indonesian religious experience Herb Feith My experience as a syncretistic Jew, or 'Yahudi abangan', has been an attempt to make my Judaic religion the starting point of learning to live religion in the plural. The term 'abangan' is borrowed from the Javanese, who use it to describe a 'syncretistic' understanding of Islam. I was born in 1930 in the city of Vienna, in Austria. At that time about twenty percent of Vienna's population was Jewish. Political life in Vienna, and in Austria, was a contest between the Catholic Party and the Socialist Party, and almost all Jews supported the Socialists. In 1934 a big conflict erupted between the government of Austria, led by right-wing Catholics, and the Vienna city council led by Socialists. The Vienna city council was eventually crushed by military force. You could say my parents were middle class. My father ran a small store selling bags; my mother was a nurse, helping a doctor who specialised in X-rays. Both were Jews but of a highly assimilated kind. My father said he was an agnostic in religious matters. My mother thought of herself as a believer in Judaism, but of a passive kind and she rarely went to the synagogue. But her mother, my maternal grandmother, was very pious and strict about religion. As long as she was alive, all the food in our home was always kosher, as the traditional Jewish dietary rules required. My father and my grandmother had a very good personal relationship, but they always differed greatly in the area of religion. My grandmother forbade anyone to mention the name of God in my presence before I was six years old. I became more aware of my Jewishness after Austria was occupied by the Germans in March 1938. We lived for a year under a Nazi government. I remember my parents were always talking together and with their friends about how to escape from Hitler's empire. They asked one another which country would give them a visa so that they could go there. My father spoke fluent English because he had lived in England for a year during World War I. Our family friends often asked him to write their letters for them applying to various countries for refugee status. In March 1939 the three of us succeeded in leaving Austria behind. We went by train to Belgium, via Germany. I remember very clearly how relieved we all felt once we crossed the German-Belgian border. My parents gave thanks in a thousand languages! They often reminded me of the Jewish story, celebrated every year at Passover, about how God liberated the Jews and brought them out of slavery in Egypt led by the Prophet Moses. We arrived in Australia in May 1939, in Melbourne. Not longer after that my mother began to attend a liberal synagogue, and I joined her. Besides synagogue on Saturdays I also attended Sunday school on Sunday mornings. My mother became more pious than she had been in Vienna. She said Hitler had turned her back into a Jew. One thing I remember clearly is how she sang the cantor in the synagogue service. She was a well-known cantor, indeed very well known in Germany before we emigrated to Australia. I recall so well the call she sang out every Saturday, the prayer called Shema, which we might call the Jewish syahadat. 'Hear O Israel, for the Lord our God is one God (Shema Yisrael Adonoi Elouhenu Adonoi Ekhod). I will sing it for you [Herb then sang it very expressively]. Socialist When I was 13 I took my Bar Mitzvah rite and had to read the Torah in Hebrew before the synagogue congregation. This meant I had been accepted as an adult Jew. After that I became a teacher in the Sunday school. But that only lasted two years. When I was 15 I began to leave the religious community. At the time I was reading various books that turned me into a humanist. I began to think of Judaism as an obstacle. Maybe I was bored, and there was some rebellion, but I called myself a socialist and an internationalist. And I was annoyed with the Jewish insistence that we should only have Jewish girlfriends or boyfriends. They were very afraid of what they called 'marrying out'! In 1947 I fell in love with Betty Evans, and six years later she became my wife. She was a socialist too, as well as an enthusiastic Christian, in fact a Methodist. We were students together at Melbourne University, and she brought me along to join the Student Christian Movement. For three years I was very much under the influence of that movement, which maintained a high intellectual standard. Besides the intellectual quality I was impressed by the moral seriousness of its members, who were often interested in issues of social and international justice. I was most impressed with theologians like Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. One thing that attracted me was the admiration SCM leaders had for Gandhi. In 1951 I began work in Jakarta, as an assistant for English at the Ministry of Information. There I had a lot of contact with the Indonesian Student Christian Movement GMKI, and with some Dutch and Swiss clergy who were teaching at the theological college. Why did I distance myself from the Jewish religion? In practical terms it was because I wanted to marry Betty. But the decision also had to do with certain beliefs: - the problem of 'marrying out', and the need for 'group survival' - the Jews as the chosen people, and exclusivism - Zionism - an aggressive Israeli state nationalism, and the pressure on Jews in the diaspora to actively support it My admiration for Gandhi, especially for his universalism, was important to me. And poverty in Asian countries was a moral challenge. For me the sufferings in the Third World (and especially in Indonesia) became far more important than things said in the synagogue sermons when I went there. My friends who remained devoted to the Judaic religion seemed to have no interest in those Third World problems. Or if they did they were rather against the so-called Third World countries - because most of those countries sided with Palestine against Israel. In Australia, as in America, the Jewish community grew increasingly affluent. Far more affluent than they had been forty years earlier, and with a tendency towards conservatism. I was often cross with the arguments put forward by the defenders of the Israeli state in Australia, especially the use of the Holocaust for propaganda purposes. It seemed as if they needed to claim that this particular genocide was unique, more terrible than any other genocide. Syncretism So what is left of my identity as a Jew? I worship more often in a church than in a synagogue. Not many of the books on religion I read are written by Judaists. But I was never baptised. So I am still a Jew. But I like to call myself 'Yahudi abangan', a syncretistic Jew, in the manner of 'Islam abangan', the 'syncretistic' Javanese Islam. I am attracted by the possibility of attaching myself to more than one religious tradition. That is something we could say is especially Asian (South Asian, East Asian, Southeast Asian - not West Asian). Gandhi said, I am a Hindu, and a Muslim, and a Christian, and a Sikh, and a Parsi, and a Jew. Sukarno spoke of himself as an adherent of nationalism, Islam and Marxism. I have been much influenced by the thought of Soedjatmoko. Arnold Toynbee, a famous English historian, once predicted that historians of the future quite possibly will say the special feature that is most important about this twentieth century is not the atomic bomb or the concentration camp, but the first intensive encounter between the Christian and Buddhist religions. In Indonesia today many people are unhappy with the word abangan, or syncretism. But I am attracted by its basic proposition, which is that we can learn from various religious traditions. I appreciate the attitude of many Christians, Jews, and Muslims that we should first study our own religions more deeply before engaging in dialogue with other believers. But I do not like it when they condemn syncretism as something inconsistent with true religion. That tends towards exclusivism. For me the purpose of dialogue between believers from religion A and religion B should be to learn. Not just to work together to face a third party. Not just to avoid the danger of conflict. Nor just to add to our knowledge of another group. The more important thing is to deepen our faith and enrich each of our spiritualities. I am very grateful that the last thirty or forty years many Westerners have allowed themselves to learn from Eastern religious traditions. Some of them are Christians, some Jews, and some belong to the Jewish nation but no longer practice the religion. I was inspired by the writings of an American Jew whose name used to be Richard Alpert and is now Baba Ram Dass. I was also attracted by a book entitled The Jew in the lotus, which told of the visit of a group of Western Jews to the Dalai Lama in India. The American Jewish novelist Chaim Potok discusses a similar theme. And I love Charles Durack on 'cultivating oneness', in the American Jewish magazine Tikkun. I have to confess I have never attempted to study the mystical traditions of the Jewish religion. If I did, quite likely I would find there things that could equally enrich my spiritual life. But for me that is not the only possibility. Herb Feith gave this talk at the Interfidei institute for inter-religious dialogue in Yogyakarta, 29 November 1998. Thanks to Samsuri. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Ideas man

Herb Feith's search for better mental road maps to a complex Indonesia Jamie Mackie One aspect of Herb's work on Indonesia that has attracted less attention than it deserved amongst the many tributes to him has been his creative role as a formulator of new ideas that throw a fresh beam of light upon the bewildering world around us. This role was especially in demand in pre-1965 Indonesia. Because Herb's lovable personal qualities have given rise to so many marvelous stories about his life, this more recondite side of his intellectual contribution to our understanding of Indonesia can easily be overlooked. Much of his work on the nation's political and social turmoil since 1945 was devoted to hunting for new and better mental road maps that would help to explain the innumerable complexities involved. It was not just his unrivalled knowledge of Indonesian society and politics, both detailed and comprehensive, that made him so special, but also his passion for better explanations that would throw light on the obscure parts of it. I recall a rather dismissive comment he once made about something written about an aspect of the Indonesian revolution which I thought was pretty good but which he waved aside as: 'Oh, that's just a piece of history'. He wanted more analysis, theorising and comparison with similar cases elsewhere - which weren't easy to find. I suppose he felt that 'mere history', or story telling, was too easy. Conceptualising was the real hard work we ought to be engaging in. It was an odd remark from the author of The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, which was such a fine blend of superb story telling about the course of events between 1950-57 and brilliantly illuminating analysis. The story will never have to be told again, apart from a few details, perhaps, because it was such excellent historical narrative. Yet what we all remember about it were his innovative ideas about relations among the elite, the political public and the newspaper-reading public, or the celebrated categorising of 1950s Indonesian political leaders into 'administrators' and 'solidarity makers'. (Years later he used to flinch whenever anyone mentioned those words in front of him. Not because he felt they were wrong, I think - which they patently weren't - or that he wanted to disown authorship of them, but because he thought they were often being used to oversimplify a more complex reality.) Later he wrote a masterly account of 'The Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in the Ruth McVey-edited Indonesia, describing the power struggle after 1959 in terms of the Sukarno-Army-PKI triangle. Not long after that came an article modifying that picture, with the revealing subtitle 'The triangle changes shape', which hit the nail on the head exactly. His celebrated exchange in the Journal of Asian Studies with the high-powered Harry Benda, after the latter's review of his book, became something of a classic. In reply to Benda's challenge: 'How could anyone have seriously expected democracy to succeed in Indonesia's circumstances?' Herb responded with an unusually 'historical' rather than theoretical answer: Indonesia in the 1950s had become a very different, more 'modern' place, he said, than the traditional Indonesia evoked by Benda. Surely he was right. Most of us who heard him lecture will recall those ingenious diagrams he would scrawl across a blackboard as road-maps to the political manoeuvring (percaturan politik) relevant to the particular phase of the game he was talking about. Parties, groups and individuals were arrayed from left to right on the horizontal axis in more or less conventional class or ideological terms, and vertically according to more exotic alignments. (There is a good example on page 14 of Indonesian political thinking 1945-1965.) We used to argue endlessly about the details, but rarely about the general framework he had set before us, which was nearly always helpful to newcomers to the subject and old hands alike. Marxist notions One of the puzzles we talked about frequently in the early years of Indonesia's independence was that conventional Marxist notions of class analysis of society and politics did not seem applicable there, for reasons Sukarno had set out well in his 'Marhaen dan Proleter'. Most peasants were not landless, although generally poor. There did not seem to be a wealthy propertied class of landlords or a bourgeoisie. The Dutch and to a lesser extent the Chinese had played roles rather like that, but their political and economic power was crumbling in the 1950s in the face of the Indonesian revolution. So what had the revolution been all about, apart from merdeka (independence)? And what would be the social and political basis of the new Indonesia? Wertheim had tried to give a more or less Marxist interpretation in his influential Indonesian society in transition, but it was less than fully satisfactory. Kahin sometimes implied a class basis to the political support he discerned for the main parties, but did not push the analysis very far. The PKI put forward some ingenious assertions about Indonesia's class structure, but they were questionable and left a great deal unexplained. Herb, on the other hand, took a more Weberian rather than Marxist approach to the problem, with greater success, in my view. His previous study of political science at the University of Melbourne under Macmahon Ball and Hugo Wolfsohn had steeped him in the debates about Marxism and the Weberian alternatives to it, mainly in terms of European and Australian politics. He was far more impressed, he once told me, by Wolfsohn's deep knowledge of the Marxist classics than he was by Ball's Nationalism and communism in East Asia. But we were all preoccupied in those days with the question of how far theories and concepts appropriate to European conditions were applicable to the radically different circumstances of Asian countries. Hence the need to find alternatives, and the excitement generated by Herb's contributions to the search. While he was at Cornell in the late 1950s Herb came under the sway of the new approaches to political and social analysis which became known as 'structural-functionalism', or more generally 'modernisation theory'. But he never really became a devotee of the latter, for he had already seen enough of the good and bad effects of Westernisation and modernisation in newly independent Indonesia not to be swept off his feet by any such panacaea. Yet he did adopt many of the concepts put forward by Lasswell, Shils, Pye, Wriggins and Arnold and Coleman, whose 1960 book on The politics of the developing areas he particularly admired. In his early years at Monash University he introduced a new wave of Australian students of Indonesian politics to these ideas. When a reaction against modernisation theory set in later in the 1960s, leading towards a new emphasis on neocolonialist interpretations of Third World poverty, then dependency theory and later a revival of class analysis, Herb moved with it, although not so wholeheartedly and without turning away from those earlier ideas. He was very much impressed for a time with Huntington's Political order in changing societies, although far from being a disciple. In the early 1970s he was much attracted by the ideas of the maverick Ivan Illich and spent a semester at his centre at Cuernavaca. But by this time Herb's most productive phase as an ideas person was ending and he was drawing increasingly on the ideas of others (there were many more others by then, including the prolific and fertile-minded Ben Anderson), including his own graduate students, like Harold Crouch and Rex Mortimer who had a big influence on him in the 1970s. He shifted increasingly towards peace studies and theories of international order in his later years. Dilemmas The timing of the reaction against modernisation theory, just after the fall of Sukarno and in the early Suharto years when the New Order was taking shape, created painful moral and intellectual dilemmas for Herb. These partly explain why his stream of new ideas about Indonesia began to dry up in later years. He was impressed and initially cheered by Suharto's success in pulling the country out of the mire of economic stagnation of the mid-1960s towards on-going economic progress. Suharto had done this largely on the advice of Herb's old friends Widjojo, Sadli and Emil Salim. But he soon became increasingly opposed to the repressive aspects of the regime and its dreadful record on human rights, especially after the seizure of East Timor in 1975. His last piece on Indonesia with an innovative thrust was his influential 1980 essay on 'repressive-developmentalist regimes', an ugly but accurate piece of phrase-making which conveyed the essence of the unbeautiful Suharto regime all too well. Was it his dismay over Indonesia's political trajectory under Suharto that caused Herb to write so little about Indonesia after 1970, or was it disillusionment with the ideas he had derived from modernisation theory which he had earlier found so stimulating and fruitful? A bit of both, I suspect, but that is too tangled and far-reaching a question to answer briefly here. The earlier unpredictability of Indonesian politics had given way to such a dominant, heavy-handed regime that there was not much scope for new ideas. But it was always ideas - and people, especially those who generated them - that really delighted him, right to the end. Jamie Mackie (jamiemackie@hotmail.com) is professor emeritus at the economics department of the Indonesia Project, Research School of Pacific & Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Bush, Osama and the planet

Bill Liddle and Herb Feith These two scholars of Indonesia exchanged emails early November 2001 about the terrorist attack in New York on September 11. The exchange began with a draft article Liddle wrote for a newspaper. Extracts: Liddle: 'Talking With Indonesian Muslims' (draft article for New York Times) Indonesian Muslims, like Muslims elsewhere, are struggling with the meaning of September 11 and its aftermath for themselves, their faith, their country, and the world. After the bombing of Afghanistan began, some militants demanded that the government of Megawati Soekarnoputri break relations with the United States. A demonstrator publicly threatened the life of the American ambassador. The majority, who are normally moderate in their views about both international and domestic affairs, have been silent in public but concerned in private. To some extent their concern reflects a lack of knowledge or wishful thinking, as in the still widespread belief that no Muslim could be guilty of such terrible acts. But many well-educated and sincere people believe that President Bush has not provided evidence of bin Laden and al Qaeda's guilt, that even if bin Laden is guilty the Taliban government of Afghanistan should not be targeted for destruction, that the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is not an ahistoric act of evil but instead the latest in a series of attacks and counter-attacks in the continuing struggle for power in the Middle East.... Feith: Rather an imaginative new twist in the historic struggle against foreign domination of the Middle East My responses to this are mixed. I think it is good that you should write in these terms to the NYT, but I also disagree with several of your emphases. Above all, I am sorry for Americans like yourself, and wonder whether I am right to be so angry with the mainstream America to which you need to relate. As I see it, Bush and Bushism are more of a problem for the species and the planet than Osama and Osamaism. My preoccupation, for which I found quite a bit of sympathy in Indonesia - I got back from there on Friday after four weeks of UGM teaching and a week in Jakarta - is with fashioning mendayung antara dua karang [steering between two rocks] strategies. Liddle: I'm not sure why you should feel sorry for 'Americans like myself,' on the assumption that I'm not mainstream America. Feith: When I say I am sorry for you I suppose I see myself as fortunate not to be in your shoes. It is hard to be an Australian these days, but to be an American would, I think, be even harder. Anyway I am delighted that you feel you can associate yourself with a mendayung antara dua karang formulation. I read somewhere recently that people are peaceminded who prefer thinking in threes to thinking in twos. Interesting isn't it? Whether you are or aren't mainstream America is semantics. What is clear to me is that your long-term political practice is mainstream, as indeed is mine, though more hesitantly. Liddle: I'm genuinely torn. Sometimes late at night I turn on CNN and see a live picture of the World Trade Centre, still smoking, and I feel both terrible anger and a conviction that the perpetrators must be caught and punished. I don't know how to do that other than to invade Afghanistan and chase down bin Laden cs. Feith: The perpetrators are Mohamad Atta and co and they are dead. Another kind of American president could, i think, have appealed to American pride, saying that we will see to it that justice is done while refusing to lower ourselves to answering terror with terror. A Republican president could have talked that language more easily than a Democratic one. I guess Powell could have taken that tack if he were president. Liddle: It may be that I am reacting this way because I am American, but I resist that conclusion. In theatres and other public events now, we are often asked to stand and sing the national anthem. Most people do, with their hand over their heart as we used to do in elementary school when saying the pledge of allegiance. I stand, but without singing or putting my hand over my heart. .... I think (with Bush? - although I am less certain about his sincerity than about my own) that it is humankind who were attacked that day, and it is humankind who should respond. Having said all this, at the same time I recognise the force of your comment that the attack was 'an imaginative new twist in the historic struggle against foreign domination of the Middle East.' I guess that's what I mean when I say I'm torn. Your comment on Bush and Bushism. I'm afraid that what Bush is doing is very popular. Feith: So was what Hitler did, so is what Sharon is doing, and probably Saddam as well. I feel quite strongly that the popularity of a leader in his state is an inappropriate criterion for actions taken in a global arena. Prof Bill Liddle (William.Liddle@polisci.sbs.ohio-state.edu) teaches at Ohio State University and has written widely on Indonesian politics. 'Inside Indonesia' thanks him for allowing us to publish these extracts of his correspondence with Herb Feith, who died a few days later. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

The first volunteer

Herb Feith, who began it all 50 years ago, inspires a new volunteer Rachael Diprose My first memory of Herb Feith is of him peddling along on his trusty bicycle several years ago near the Gadjah Mada University campus in Yogyakarta. The sun was softly falling on his thinning hair, his glasses perched on the tip of his nose, as he sat straight-backed in a faded batik shirt, negotiating the potholes. I thought, 'so this is the infamous Herb Feith', popular amongst Indonesian and Australian students alike, respected academic and Indonesianist, and exactly the picture of eccentricity I had envisaged. He was working as an Australian volunteer in Indonesia, teaching politics. I am now lamenting the fact that when I was an Australian student on exchange in Indonesia I considered my Indonesian language skills inadequate to attend one of his very popular classes. Missed opportunities. Several years later, working as an Australian volunteer in Jakarta, I was lucky enough to meet with Pak Herb. He was the guest speaker at the opening of a photo exhibition held in Jakarta in November 2001, celebrating 50 Years of Australian volunteering. Pak Herb pioneered the Volunteer Graduate Scheme in 1951 when he came by boat to Indonesia to serve as an interpreter in the Sukarno government administration. At the time he received a small, local salary, working alongside the Indonesian staff under local conditions, with the objective of promoting cross-cultural understanding. Several things stand out about what Pak Herb said that evening. He spoke of 'curiosity' and 'solidarity'. The curiosity that arises when one becomes a volunteer and moves to a foreign country, and the solidarity one feels with those who are suffering and who don't have the basic rights others take for granted. Pak Herb described the fascination of those first volunteers with the Indonesian community, their way of life, political system, and open friendliness. This same curiosity and solidarity has led many volunteers to become respected academics in Indonesian studies, human rights campaigners, researchers and policy makers back home. Being there In light of the September 11 tragedy, Pak Herb highlighted the dangerous and saddening divide developing between what some call Muslim and non-Muslim countries. He spoke for many Australian volunteers currently living in Indonesia, who believe that now is the most important moment to be in-country. In times of uncertainty, simply being in Indonesia is a significant contribution we can make to our workplaces or the communities in which we live, despite the pressure from some families and friends to return home. This makes a stronger statement about Australians and our personal commitment to Indonesia than any foreign news report. Volunteers may be placed in large cities, or very remote communities, depending on where their skills are required. When a volunteer moves to their placement country, they are given some preliminary language training. But they still have to overcome the communication barriers, learn to understand the culture, adapt to the food and climate, and simply learn a new way of living. However, lifetime friendships and extraordinary personal growth are the rewards that volunteers take with them when they return to Australia. Employed as a translator and English editor with an Indonesian research institute, I could communicate to some extent upon arrival. However, learning to speak another language and live in another culture is a constant process, no matter how long a volunteer has been living in-country. And it is a joint learning process. My friends and colleagues seem to delight in my Australian mannerisms and question me constantly about customs at home. As an independent, somewhat assertive, unmarried female, I feel at times like something of an enigma. While this is not unheard of in Indonesia, at present I still fall into the minority. Taxi and bajaj (automated pedicabs) drivers are amazed that I have not had children. Learning to eat with my hands at the office, without rice ending up all over my face and clothes, took months of perseverance! Living in a densely populated city has been challenging for me after the wide, open spaces of Australia. Yet, when I go home at the end of each day I am constantly amazed at the new experiences I have shared. In what once seemed so foreign, I now find peace and tranquility in the call to prayer. I have learnt to order my day around the monsoon rains. I can see lifelong friendships forming, and imagine my relationship with Indonesia continuing long into the future. I only hope that I can give back a fraction of the wonderful experience that my friends have given me, and carry on the legacy of Pak Herb. Rachael Diprose (rdiprose@smeru.or.id) is an Australian Volunteer (www.ozvol.org.au) working at the Smeru Research Institute in Jakarta. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Antidote to parochialism

Herb Feith It is delightful to see so many old friends here. Let me say a few things on behalf of the 1950s generation of volunteers. I think the most important thing to say is that we enjoyed ourselves enormously while we were here. It extended our curiosity fairly persistently, it stretched us, it empowered us, it gave us a sense of being able to relate comfortably to more than one culture. And some of us got a lot of career advantages out of it too. We were young, we were a bit radical, so we also saw ourselves as engaging in a form of protest, staying with Indonesian families and hostels rather than European enclaves, riding our bikes when other slack people were being driven in cars. We saw ourselves as particularly against white colonial attitudes, against expatriate lifestyles and so on. In fact we had a pretty a strong sense of our own moral superiority towards them. And when we got back to Australia, we saw ourselves as being in the van of enlightenment on things like racism and parochialism. And when I speak of parochialism I don't mean merely Australian parochialism, I also mean Western parochialism, which is sometimes called first-world parochialism and which is, as you well know, well and truly alive. There's a temptation on occasions like this to exaggerate the contributions that volunteers have made particularly to the Australia-Indonesia relationship. Obviously, people who came here as volunteers are only a part of the Australians who've been Indonesianised in the way they live. But it is true that a lot of meaningful friendships developed from all of those people living here, and those have survived the bad period. They survived the '63 to'65 bad period, and they survived the bad period of two years ago. Looking at Australia today, it's certainly a lot more multicultural country than it was when our fifties group of volunteers came here, and it's a country which engages Asia in far more ways. But it's still a country in which first-world parochialism is a very powerful force. Australians who see themselves as citizens of a planet are still a pretty small minority, and that's become painfully clear to us, particularly recently over the asylum-seekers issue, over the people coming in tiny boats from long distances, and ultimately from places like Iraq and Afghanistan. And of course it's become clear to us as a result of the events of September the 11th in New York and Washington. The 'all the way with the USA' responses that have been so dominant in Australia have given all of us a great deal to ponder about and indeed a great deal to be anxious about. So those of us who believe in solidarity with Asians and people in other third-world countries still have an awful lot of battles to fight. But it's a happy thing that we've been empowered in relation to those battles by a lot of very valuable Indonesian friendships. Thanks for doing that. From Herb's remarks at the 50th anniversary celebration for Australian Volunteers International held in Jakarta, 2 November 2001. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Australians volunteer

The history of Australian Volunteers International begins in Indonesia Peter Britton In 1950, at an international student conference (World University Service Assembly) in Bombay, India, the Indonesian delegation challenged the Australians with an interesting idea. The Dutch had departed. Their colonial educational policy had left independent Indonesia desperately short of skilled graduates. Indonesia, the students said, would welcome Australian university graduates to make their expertise available. They would live and work alongside Indonesian colleagues, deliberately crossing the barriers of expatriate life in favour of solidarity. This would allow genuine understanding to flourish. The idea inspired a group of people at the University of Melbourne to develop it further. They wanted to share their skills on the same rates of pay as their Indonesian colleagues, whilst learning more intimately about the people and their lives. Herbert Feith was a member of the committee. He became the first Australian volunteer that same year when he sailed to Jakarta to work as a translator with the Ministry of Information. His assignment marked the beginnings of Australia's international volunteer program, now known as Australian Volunteers International. Indonesia became the birthplace of international volunteering. In the last fifty years more than 5,000 Australians have volunteered to live and work alongside local people in nearly seventy countries across Asia, Africa, the Pacific islands, Latin America, the Middle East and in indigenous communities in Australia. Most go for two years. They work in an amazing range of occupational sectors. All are placed in response to specific requests from host employers. During the 1970s, volunteer programs started to be seen as service providers to foreign aid programs, and volunteers as a source of cheap technical assistance. Many volunteer agencies reacted to this quandary by ensuring that their volunteers were better remunerated such that the distinction between volunteers and other expatriate experts became blurred. Australian Volunteers International sought a different remedy, recognising that volunteers were privileged in other ways. Living and working together is a powerful tool for experiential learning - to establish common cause and exchange skills and understandings. For Australian Volunteers International, a volunteer is a person who, at some personal cost, moves outside the comfort zone of familiarity. Through their actions they make a commitment to connect to their new community and try to make a difference. They challenge fundamental ideas in their home society, eg that people will only act if there is a promise of financial reward. They help build true partnerships across cultures, breaking down stereotypes of nationality, profession, and gender. What motivates a volunteer is a complex mixture of factors. Altruism and self-interest can be important, not in the narrow sense, but in that personal growth represents valid self-interest, an avenue to participate in a sense of global community that crosses borders. When receiving Life Membership of Australian Volunteers International (University of Sydney, 19 January 2001), Herbert Feith preferred to call it 'curiosity': 'Curiosity can also be mischievous, but I think it is a pretty healthy thing that people with one set of cultural "baggage" should learn about people with a different cultural, social and economic background.' The Indonesia program has always been a cornerstone of Australian Volunteers International. The experiences of the first Australian volunteers in Indonesia have done much to shape the organisation's style. Perhaps in large measure because the Indonesia-Australia relationship is one between neighbours, it is subject to a great deal of scrutiny. Over the last fifty years there have been tense periods in the official relationship between the two countries. Despite these difficulties a vibrant people-to-people relationship has always continued, helped significantly by the Australian Volunteers International program. Many former volunteers, starting with Herb Feith, have gone on to influential positions in academia, government service, the corporate sector, the judiciary and the community sector. There they committed themselves to the relationship and became significant interpreters of Indonesian developments to the Australian community. Similarly, Indonesians who have worked alongside Australian volunteers have learnt that Australians do not fit the stereotypes as projected by the media and politically motivated opinion leaders. The relationships have stood the test of time. In November 2001 a photo exhibition in Jakarta portrayed aspects of Australian Volunteers in Indonesia over fifty years. It was remarkable how many Indonesians, whose experience of the program was decades old, made the effort to attend the celebration. Since 1951 nearly 400 Australian volunteers have lived and worked across the archipelago in most provinces. They have been engaged in education, health, agriculture, community development, environment and other sectors. They have worked in government departments and agencies, universities, schools and other educational institutions, as well as national level and local level non-government organisations (NGOs). Recent changes The post-Suharto era brought a whole new set of circumstances, including an abrupt break in the Australia-Indonesia relationship over East Timor. It became essential for Australian Volunteers International to take these changes into account. Many central government functions have been decentralised to district level government. With the latter now delivering services to the people, this becomes an appropriate focus for Australian volunteers to share their skills, as well as learn directly about the communities they serve. Responses to this approach have been very encouraging. Several district (kabupaten) governments have requested volunteers to be with them. Indonesian NGOs have changed as well. Vast increases in foreign funding saw many established NGOs abandon their traditional activities, and many new NGOs appear. Australian Volunteers International recognised a need to be even more selective, to ensure that the organisations we worked with were driven by values rather than simply business opportunities. Many Australian aid activities have long been concentrated in the eastern part of Indonesia. We discovered during a review that there were growing misconceptions among some Indonesians about Australia's intentions. The view was that Australia wanted to see Indonesia 'break up'. To demonstrate our bona fide intentions, Australian Volunteers International has also sought opportunities for cooperation in western Indonesia. The phenomenon was linked to assertions that Australians were anti-Islamic and only comfortable working with the predominantly Christian communities in eastern Indonesia. By seeking to work with Muslim organisations, Australian volunteers can demonstrate that not all Australians share the Western phobia of Islam, and are genuinely interested in the philosophy and ways of life of their neighbours. Just as importantly, the knowledge these Australians develop can inform their own community. We expect this component of our program to grow. Indonesians have responded enthusiastically to the new strategies. They appreciate the intrinsic value of exposing Australians to Indonesian issues. Similarly, they recognise that Indonesians can learn from Australian outlooks and personalities. Each 'side' has the opportunity to make that leap of understanding that enables us to see through others' eyes. Peter Britton (pbritton@ozvol.org.au) is a senior manager at Australian Volunteers International (www.ozvol.org.au). He first visited Indonesia in 1968, and has since then written widely about it (including 'Profesionalisme dan ideologi militer Indonesia', Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996). Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Is reconciliation sleeping with the devil?

The dilemmas of negotiating an end to conflict Vanessa Johanson Reverend Benny Giay exemplifies the complexity of approaches needed to resolve Indonesia's conflicts. As well as being one of the founders of the Irian Jaya Forum for Reconciliation (Foreri), he is also a vehement advocate of justice for human rights cases, is writing a book about Papuan heroes to rectify the skewed history in the history books, and was involved in the early days of the pro-independence Papua Presidium Council. His story demonstrates some of the many dilemmas of conflict transformation work in Indonesia's complex conflicts. How does one stay neutral in the midst of brutality? How does one deal with one's own political preferences when trying to encourage a negotiated process? How does one take a stand for justice, while at the same time insisting on a non-violent, non-confrontational process? And how does one do any kind of work for change in a situation where one's life and one's colleagues' lives are under daily threat? Many human rights advocates see themselves as being involved in conflict transformation (or its sister concepts: conflict resolution, peace-building, conflict prevention, etc.) and vice versa. It is indeed possible to work in both human rights and conflict transformation at once, but the distinction between the two approaches to social change, peace and justice is quite stark. Conflict resolvers try to work with both or many sides on many levels, in order to bring long-term peace and justice through mutual acknowledgement of the other sides' interests and needs. Human rights advocates focus as a matter of principle on the state as culprit and as the party ultimately obligated to create conditions and institutions which guarantee human rights protection and peace. Rather than dialogue, they tend to carry out investigations, lobby and utilise legal systems to achieve change. I write as someone who has worked as a human rights activist, a non-violence and peace campaigner, and conflict transformation practitioner in Indonesia and Australia. In my view, Indonesia's many violent conflicts, some involving the state directly, some very indirectly, need many nuanced approaches in order to resolve them effectively. And we need to be clear about the methods we are using and the reason for choosing these methods. Conflict transformation The choice to use conflict transformation methods is both a moral and a pragmatic one. The moral choice is in part a recognition that process is as important as outcome, and a belief that, put simply, a conflict transformation approach brings out the best in people, and can fundamentally change people and systems in a moral and not just a legal sense. It attempt to engage and accommodate as many interests as possible by means of activities such as multi-level dialogue based on open mutual recognition of conflict and a need to end it through non-violent means; education for pluralism; joint multi-ethnic, multi-religious activities of all kinds; negotiation and mediation; and media which report and demonstrate resolutions rather than focusing on violence. Conflict transformation workers do their utmost not to take sides. In fact the only thing conflict resolvers 'advocate' as such is a process which is non-violent and promotes dialogue. Benny Giay expressed the difficulty of neutrality when he explained his involvement in the mediation with pro-independence kidnappers for the release of two Belgian hostages in Papua last year. 'The church was seen by everyone as the most neutral party possible to do the mediation. But some of the people in the community there condemned Christianity, and called on the heavens to open up and bring floods on Indonesia.' In another example, the Irian Jaya Forum for Reconciliation became swept up in pro- and anti-independence politics and is now relatively inactive. The moral choice of conflict transformation practitioners is also based on a belief that an aggressive approach to ending aggression will ultimately lead to continued bad relations in the future, and ultimately to more aggression. Even conflict transformation's most ardent supporters have their limits, however. Some would draw the line at pursuing dialogue with violent husbands, others with the likes of vicious East Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres, others would only draw the line at Hitler or military butchers like Benny Murdani. There are many pragmatic reasons for choosing conflict transformation techniques. Sometimes it is simply a matter of survival, in which case arguments of principle are regrettably less relevant. Continued use of force or vehement argument for change in some situations only invites destruction or endless expensive military deadlock, and therefore dialogue is essential. It is a pragmatic choice of taking the long road of discussion rather than the short one of annihilation or political and economic bankruptcy. Sometimes the pragmatic choice is not so extreme, but dialogue is seen as the most effective technique in a particular conflict, in order to resolve it to everyone's satisfaction and prevent recurrence. Those choosing a multi-level dialogue approach may not deny that the problem was perhaps caused - by commission or omission - by one powerful party, often the state. Nevertheless, in most situations, maintaining sustained peace and justice is something in which everyone needs to be involved, not just the lead antagonist/s in the conflict. In many countries - Indonesia included - where genocide or long-term abuses have occurred, there are far too many culprits, far too many victims, far too little hard evidence and far too weak a justice system to execute, jail or fine everybody involved. Therefore reconciliation processes are chosen as the best way of achieving a sense of justice without using time-consuming human rights or legal approaches. Unfortunately, in Indonesia, sometimes the mediation road is taken because there is no other effective mechanism - be it strong democratic institutions, reliable media or a functioning, clean justice system - to help solve conflicts. Justice Conflict transformation approaches, however, have a hard time taking effect unless there is some kind of a justice system, or at least an overall sense of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour within which they can operate. This is acknowledged in mediation theory through what is sometimes called 'legitimacy', or a mutually agreed, 'neutral and objective' set of standards. This 'legitimacy' may be a pact like the South African Peace Accord, it may be shared religious values, it may be a law itself like the Geneva Conventions or a national constitution, or it may simply be a shared agreement, for example, that killing is unacceptable whatever the reasons. Some human rights advocates reject conflict transformation as an invitation to do deals with the devil, to water down hard-won standards, and to deflect the blame for violence onto the victims, or at least onto the 'foot soldiers' rather than the 'generals'. Indeed, conflict transformation acknowledges that there are different versions of 'truth,' 'right,' and 'just,' and that for example General Wiranto should be able to have his version aired (non-violently) just as much as East Timor's Bishop Belo or ousted refugees should. Conflict transformation avoids allocating blame or dwelling on the past, no matter how painful, in order to try to achieve shared futures. Unfortunately, like many useful terms (such as 'development,' and 'empowerment'), 'reconciliation' has gained itself a skewed meaning in Indonesia, both during and since the New Order. In Pontianak, West Kalimantan, a Madurese community leader told me how he had been asked by the local government to sign a peace declaration with the Dayaks. He was picked up from his house by the military, he recounted, and led to the forum with an already-prepared declaration by two soldiers, and asked to sign. 'It's not what I call reconciliation,' he laughed, several years, and several violent inter-ethnic incidents later. The recently negotiated Malino Declaration for peace in Poso, Sulawesi, brokered by a flown-in top-level delegation from the government in Jakarta, has attracted much praise as well as criticism. Many see it as shallow and imposed. Others on the contrary see it as providing much-needed political space and legitimacy for community follow-up which will provide lasting peace. Conflict transformation is far from the answer to all conflicts in all contexts. Human rights advocacy is very much in synergy with the work of conflict transformation by providing the space for dialogue, particularly with difficult and powerful players, by demanding top-level responsibility for abuses and by providing a norm of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Activists like Benny Giay demonstrate this fact in their different choices of approach. Vanessa Johanson (vjohanson@eudoramail.com) is an 'Inside Indonesia' board member. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Waiting for peace in Poso

Why has this Muslim-Christian conflict continued for three years? Lorraine V Aragon Poso district residents have lived with religious violence since December 1998. After three years of episodic fighting, death toll estimates range from 1,000 to 2,500, with thousands more injured. Scores of churches and mosques have been torched. Nearly 100,000 have fled their burning homes, leaving the capital of Poso district described at one time as a 'dead city', though some are now returning. It began as a street fight between hot-headed young men, one Protestant and one Muslim, during a tense local political campaign. The brawl quickly deteriorated into a religiously polarised battle in this formerly quiet, multiethnic region. Police and military forces could not, or would not, stop the arson and attacks between the two communities. The infrastructure of Poso city and surrounding towns is devastated. Refugees in holding camps suffer harsh conditions and burden locals - mostly Muslims in Palu and South Sulawesi, mostly Christians in North Sulawesi, Tentena, and the Lore Valley. Fear and vengefulness have made it difficult to stop the cycle of bloodshed. A recent peace agreement formulated in Malino, South Sulawesi, shows promise but faces challenges in its implementation. Dutch missionaries from the early 1900s converted indigenous animist groups in the mountainous interior of what is now Central Sulawesi province. The colonial administration envisioned these Protestants as an allied population buffer against Muslim-influenced coastal kingdoms. Many of these slash-and-burn farmers were resettled in model villages and taught wet-rice farming by the Dutch. Most groups living around Poso Lake, between Poso and the mission center of Tentena, came to identify themselves ethnically as Pamona. The Japanese Occupation and independence in 1945 was followed by a chaotic period when Muslim rebels from South Sulawesi attacked interior animists and Christians. Yet, once the Suharto regime took control, the majority population of the region still was Protestant ('Kristen' in Indonesian), and Pamona leaders exercised partial control over the local bureaucracy. Much had changed by the end of Suharto's presidency. In 1973, Suharto designated Central Sulawesi as one of ten new transmigration provinces. The Trans-Sulawesi Highway was cut into the rugged mountain forests to ease the path for transmigrants. The new roads and settlements also attracted a flood of voluntary migrants, especially Muslim Bugis and Makassar people from South Sulawesi. The financial crisis beginning in late 1997 spurred further immigration into the ebony-producing Poso area. Entrepreneurial Muslims arrived from South Sulawesi to cash-crop cacao, an agricultural export that maintained an exceptionally high value during the crisis. Pamona Protestants lost their religious and ethnic majorities in the district. Many also had been displaced from their ancestral lands through processes of land commodification that had nothing to do with religion. Pamona Protestant Christians, like many interior groups in the outer islands, had also lost some of their indigenous political control. After the 1970s, much local authority was removed from customary councils of elders and transferred to a national bureaucracy. Modernist Muslims were installed in high-ranking military posts and Christians found it harder to get their leaders selected for local governance. By the end of his presidency, Suharto himself had become more pro-Muslim. Protestant mission funding became closely regulated. The government seized many schools and clinics originally funded by churches. District mayor When the Poso violence began in December 1998, the district mayor (bupati) of Poso was a Muslim named Arief Patanga. Patanga's term of office was due to expire in June 1999. His district secretary (sekretaris wilayah daerah, sekwilda) was a Protestant Pamona named Yahya Patiro. This type of religious power-sharing at the district level had been known in earlier New Order Poso. Many Christians hoped Patiro would succeed his Muslim predecessor. Muslim factions, representing Bugis-influenced ethnic groups along the coast and towards South Sulawesi, promoted Muslim candidates. The new economic stakes raised the election heat. The 1999 Regional Autonomy Laws promised a shift in control over resources from the national to the regional level. Both Muslim and Christian elites in Poso viewed this election as critical to their future access to government contracts. The street fight that began in the heart of Poso city on the eve of both Christmas and Ramadan, 1998, fed into religious tensions promoted by inflammatory graffiti during the campaign. Soon, supporters from allied towns arrived to reinforce the Protestant and Muslim mobs. After a week of chaotic street fighting and arson, about 200 people were injured and 400 homes burned. Reportedly, Christians suffered most of the damage in what became the conflict's 'first phase'. A Pamona Protestant leader of the political campaign, Herman Parimo, was jailed for heading a group of fighting Christians. No Muslims were prosecuted. This apparently partisan response by the authorities increased Protestant resentment. A second escalating street fight occurred in mid-April 2000. By that time, a Muslim (although not the prior incumbent's favourite) had been installed as the new district mayor. When a Muslim youth reported being knifed by a Protestant, a Muslim posse began a retaliation campaign that the police could not handle. Supporters with homemade weapons again arrived from allied Muslim and Protestant towns. Army personnel followed from Makassar, South Sulawesi, but the fighting continued for over two weeks. By early May, over 700 homes had been burned, mostly belonging to Christians, along with several church buildings and a police barracks. Thousands of refugees, mostly Christians, fled. The 'third phase' began only three weeks later when a group of Christians made a night-time raid on the Muslims they considered responsible for the earlier destruction of Christian neighbourhoods. The masked 'ninja' group of about a dozen men is alleged to have included both Protestant Pamona and Catholic immigrants from Flores who resided in the Poso district. Fighting then intensified throughout the region, abetted by teams of local Christian militias. This third phase culminated in a massacre of Javanese men who fled to a Muslim boarding school in a transmigration area south of Poso. Over a hundred were executed with homemade weapons, their bodies tossed in the Poso River and mass graves. The fighting continued until the end of July 2000, when three Catholic ringleaders were captured. These Flores immigrants were tried between December 2000 and April 2001, when they were sentenced to death. To date, their appeals have been rejected and they await execution by firing squad. Despite a few high-profile reconciliation efforts in late 2000, many criticised the lack of government aid and biased processes of law enforcement. Sporadic fighting continued and most refugees were too scared to return home. Instead, the population underwent an increasing de facto religious segregation - Muslims in Poso city, Protestants in the highland towns. During the first months of 2001, violence worsened again. In addition to surprise attacks on farmers, disgruntled factions planted bombs in religious buildings and police posts. After the three Catholics were sentenced to death, attacks on Muslims increased. This began to be called 'phase four.' Then in July, the Laskar Jihad group, based in Yogyakarta, sent emissaries to meet with senior religious and government leaders in Central Sulawesi. Violence surged again at the end of 2001 when thousands of well-armed Laskar Jihad troops were added to the volatile mix of local fighters. Over a hundred more persons were killed in what we can call 'phase five'. By mid-November, desperate pleas emerged from Protestant towns. Christians reported invasions by Muslim militias who threatened to rule the area by the end of Ramadan. At least half a dozen churches and 4,000 houses in thirty villages were burned, seemingly under the blind eye of security forces. Roughly 15,000 more people fled their homes. Muslim militias seized control of fuel stations and roadside checkpoints, where some displayed posters of Osama bin Laden. In the aftermath of September 11th, these reports caught the attention of government officials and human rights workers in the United States and elsewhere, and led to pressure on the Indonesian government to control radical Muslims. Peace agreement On December 4, 2001, Indonesia's chief security minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, traveled to Sulawesi to meet with Muslim and Christian leaders. Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister for the People's Welfare (Menko Kesra), was assigned as mediator. Roughly fifty delegates, half Muslim and half Christian, met separately with Kalla in Malino, South Sulawesi. On December 20, 2001, a ten-point bilateral peace agreement was announced. With the arrival of 4,000 military and police, as well as national and international attention on Central Sulawesi, Christmas proceeded peacefully. At New Year's, four Protestant churches were bombed in the provincial capital of Palu, but implementation of the accord continued. The Malino Agreement includes some unarguable points: both sides should stop fighting, obey laws, expect security forces to be firm and fair, reject unauthorised 'outside' interference or militias, stop slander, and promote apologies and respect for all traditions and religions. Problems likely will come in implementing points such as weapons collection and the return of property to 'pre-conflict' status. It will be difficult to divide rehabilitation funds fairly and resettle about 90,000 refugees, who may claim land now occupied by other mobile citizens. Finally, there is the lingering issue of power sharing at the political level, an issue raised by the Christian delegates, but not included in the final peace agreement. Lorraine Aragon (aragonl@mail.ecu.edu) teaches anthropology at East Carolina University in Greenville, North Carolina, USA. She has published several articles and a book on highland Sulawesi ('Fields of the Lord', University of Hawai'i Press, 2000). Her longer article about the Poso conflicts appears in Cornell University's journal 'Indonesia', vol. 72, October 2001. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Aceh negotiation ups and downs

Mar 1998 - Acehnese students join anti-Suharto protests by highlighting military abuses in Aceh 7 Aug 1998 - Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto announces the lifting of Aceh's Special Operations Area (DOM) status, apologises for human rights abuse 4 Feb 1999 - Large Acehnese student congress (Kongres Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Aceh Serantau) demands referendum on Aceh's future. The call is taken up by religious leaders Jun 1999 - Aceh military commander Col Syarifuddin Tippe offers GAM ceasefire negotiations 4 Nov 1999 - New President Abdurrahman Wahid says the Acehnese have a right to a referendum, but immediately 'clarifies' this 27 Jan 2000 - Negotiations begin in Geneva between the Indonesian government and GAM, facilitated by Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) 12 May 2000 - Humanitarian Pause agreed in Geneva. Not quite a ceasefire, it emphasises humanitarian cooperation Sep 2000 - Humanitarian Pause extended till 15 January 2001 Jan 2001 - The Joint Forum in Geneva agrees to negotiate about 'substantive issues' to 'seek a formula for a lasting and comprehensive solution to the conflict in Aceh' 15 Jan 2001 - The Humanitarian Pause, renamed a Moratorium, is extended for only one month amid hardened rhetoric and growing violence from both sides Mar 2001 - Exxon closes its three gas fields in Aceh after GAM attacks. They reopen in July 12 Mar 2001 - Indonesian cabinet declares GAM 'separatist' 11 Apr 2001 - President Wahid issues a presidential instruction (Inpres 4/ 2001) that permits redeployment of more troops to Aceh 20 Jul 2001 - Arrest of six GAM negotiators at Kuala Tripa Hotel, Banda Aceh 23 Jul 2001 - President Megawati Sukarnoputri installed. Her Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, was the chief Indonesian negotiator in Geneva 5 Feb 2002 - Military Area (Kodam) re-established in Aceh, amid determined push by TNI to defeat GAM insurgency Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Between war and peace

An insider speaks about peace negotiations on Aceh Otto Syamsuddin Ishak Dialogue was first discussed late 1999, but the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was reluctant. The great service of the Swiss-based organisation the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) is that they were able to sit the two sides down at one table. The first HDC mission came to Aceh early in 2000. HDC had to decide which Acehnese resistance faction they would deal with - GAM or MP-GAM. Each was led by exiles in Sweden who had fought in Aceh in 1976. Indonesia preferred MP-GAM, but GAM had the biggest presence on the ground. The choice fell on GAM, and they formed a delegation with representatives from the Swedish leadership as well as commanders from Aceh. It was difficult. GAM feared being deceived by Indonesia, while the Indonesian government thought of GAM as intractable. I went to Geneva for the first meeting on 24 April 2000. The atmosphere was tense. As a resource person, I had to provide information about human rights after 1998 that might help lead to a peaceful resolution. HDC took a humanitarian approach. GAM accordingly stressed Indonesian human rights abuses. Indonesian representative Hassan Wirayuda, by contrast, said little about the situation on the ground and wanted to discuss a special autonomy solution like the one he helped broker in the southern Philippines. He was accompanied by the military attache from the Paris embassy, so the Indonesian delegation tended to ignore human rights. However, the agreement signed on 12 May 2000 was fairly good in that it did revolve around humanitarian issues, and it called on both sides to show restraint. A Joint Forum was established in Geneva, to meet once in three months. In Aceh there were two joint committees, for security and for humanitarian action, as well as an independent team to monitor implementation of security aspects - of which I was secretary. Four district monitoring teams were formed in December 2000 as well. In order to create a conducive sense of security, the agreement stipulated that all troop movements whether GAM or Indonesian should be reported to the joint security committee in Banda Aceh. However, President Wahid was unable to control his military, and the TNI just ignored that provision. After the agreement was signed, Indonesia unilaterally put in place a set of 'permanent procedures' (prosedur tetap, or protap). But GAM rejected them because they made no allowance for reporting troop movements. Chivalrous For me it was the first time I had met many of the top Acehnese in the resistance. They struck me as chivalrous. They were so committed. But I felt nervous that upon my return to Aceh I might be intimidated by both sides. So I asked HDC to guarantee my security. They produced a letter signed by GAM and by the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Department. Foreign Affairs picked me up at the airport. But the differences between them and TNI Headquarters became obvious when we went out to the field. Foreign Affairs had no authority there. I was often intimidated. Police Colonel Ridwan Karim, Indonesian delegation leader on the joint committee for security, and former commander of the force sent in to Aceh following the troop withdrawal in 1999, said in public that I was pro-GAM. In Jakarta, President Wahid was under attack. Parliamentary speaker Akbar Tanjung of Golkar blamed Wahid for initiating the Aceh dialogue without consulting parliament. The TNI, meanwhile, made it clear it was not about to acknowledge GAM as an equal negotiating partner because GAM was 'not a state'. Nevertheless, the 12 May agreement was unprecedented in Indonesian history. Unlike the final resolution of the Darul Islam revolt in 1962, which was a personal affair between Acehnese leader Daud Beureueh and Indonesian military commander LtGen M Jasin, this was an institutional agreement not dependent on personalities. Its big weakness was that HDC was unable to guarantee the security of its partners in the peace process. For example when Tengku Al Kamal, a member of the monitoring committee for security, was killed by Indonesia in South Aceh on 30 March 2001, HDC did not even do anything for his family. Yet he had been killed while on duty as a partner with HDC. The HDC negotiations of early 2000 did offer a new alternative for the conflict, but after it was signed HDC was no longer the engine of transformation. Instead, the initiative passed to GAM and the Republic of Indonesia. GAM took advantage of it to recruit new fighters and to establish a new village structure in areas it controlled. Indonesia meanwhile sent in even more troops, who set up new posts and, under the cover of providing humanitarian assistance, conducted counter-insurgency intelligence operations in the villages. Nor was HDC able to create a new common understanding of the conflict, as its mission statement indicates it wanted to do. HDC used none of the abundant human rights information (which had strong humanitarian relevance) to create a new consensus. Instead, Jakarta dominated the media, leaving HDC with no room to build on the agreement that had been reached. That reduced the credibility of HDC especially within Indonesia. Indeed, HDC's influence declined sharply as one moved from the international to the grassroots level. For example, the agreement made provision for regular meetings between GAM and TNI field commanders. And these did take place. But GAM was suspicious that TNI would use these meetings to capture senior commanders, so they only sent second or third level commanders. When Indonesia withdrew from the meetings, complaining that GAM was not sending its top commander Abdullah Syafi'ie, HDC again had nothing to say. This was followed by the arrest of the entire GAM negotiating team in Banda Aceh in July 2001. Of course HDC had no troops to enforce any agreement, but it might have been able to save its principles if it had brought in other mediators with more clout such as US-AID. Lessons I thought 12 May was a moment of great hope. I felt excited, but also anxious about attitudes on the two sides - GAM stubborn as Acehnese generally are, and Indonesia cunning and always ready to use violence. Considering the generally negative Indonesian response to the agreement, the enthusiasm with which countries like Norway and the US greeted it was perhaps naive. We can draw two lessons from the HDC process. The first is that this cannot be resolved as a domestic Indonesian problem. Within Southeast Asia it has a negative impact on Malaysia and Singapore because of the Acehnese refugees. And more globally the massive American investment by Exxon is under threat of insecurity. These concerns should lead to more international involvement. Second, the loss of HDC's credibility in Indonesian eyes led to a spiral of violence. That is why I am excited about the latest development, in which the United States is supporting the HDC process with an additional initiative known as the Four Wise Men. The American idea, conceived before Megawati became president, is that she can work together better with the military and may be able to control them. One of the four individuals will be an influential American, one a Japanese (they buy a lot of gas from Aceh, but are not keen to be involved), one from Yugoslavia who is a friend of Megawati, and Surin Pitsuwan, former Thai foreign minister who is Muslim. TNI think they can resolve the Aceh issue alone. Shooting dead top GAM commander Tgk Abdullah Syafi'ie on 22 January 2002 encouraged them. But GAM immediately appointed a replacement, Muzakkir Manaf. They are well organised. And the Acehnese now have two new martyrs - Abdullah Syafi'i and his wife (who died with him). To them he was a model of humanism, unpretentious, simple, and devout. That he will become a legend is obvious even from the Indonesian press reporting of his death, which was positive about him and did not describe the soldiers who shot him as heroes. Otto Syamsuddin Ishak has published two books on Aceh. The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue website is: www.hdcentre.org. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

We are all one

How custom overcame religious rivalry in Southeast Maluku P M Laksono Southeast Maluku has been neglected not only in the story of the fighting throughout Maluku from early 1999, but also in that of its end. The district capital Tual is located in the Kei Islands, just 800 km to the north of Darwin in Australia. Indonesian newspapers reported hardly any details about the outbreak of fighting on 31 March 1999, except to suggest that hundreds died and tens of thousands became refugees. Almost nothing has been written about why the fighting stopped and what brought the community together again. Like chocolate melting from the edges in, so the Indonesian state in Maluku experienced structural melt-down after Suharto resigned in 1998. Its ability to bind groups together vanished. The dominance of Golkar, of money, of the values of developmentalism, and of the military, which had held Indonesia together, evaporated and left people disoriented. They lost their trust in the system. When religious fighting broke out in Ambon in January 1999, it created enormous confusion in Southeast Maluku. People lost their grip on reality and a kind of anarchy broke out. Why should the state be so important in a remote place like Tual? We have to understand that the classic liberal concept of the state - one that doesn't interfere in the market or in people's lives except to provide security and perhaps welfare - has never applied in Maluku. There has never been a free, independent economy. Instead, there is close collaboration between the state, capital, and the values of modernisation and development. Everything has been a monopoly of the state - from rice to petrol. Southeast Maluku is actually not a remote area. In the early 1960s, the district head (bupati) was a big man. He had to be inventive to fulfil the area's budgetary needs. But by the mid-1980s, with the New Order at its height, all the money came from Jakarta, without any effort at all on the part of the district head. The district had gone from self-sufficiency to an extreme degree of dependency. Human development had actually regressed - the opposite of what the development program intended. Instead of eating food made from the local sago and poisonous cassava, the civil servants in town now ate rice and instant noodles - all imported by the state and by big capital. Civil servants are the backbone of urban society. By the end of the 1980s nearly all the rupiah flowing into the district came from civil service salaries. Almost no rupiah came in outside the government budget. Agriculture is just subsistence. There is practically no export - just a little copra and marine products. The big fishing trawlers that frequent Tual harbour are Taiwanese and pay their money to Jakarta. The whole of society depends on the state - even if only as a labourer at a school building site. Segregation Even now it is not clear who started the conflict in the Kei Islands in 1999. There was a rumour that Islam had been insulted, and a fight broke out on the border between Tual town (Islamic) and neighbouring Ta'ar (Protestant). Every village is relatively homogeneous in religious terms. Even those few villages that are mixed have exclusively Protestant, Catholic and Islamic neighbourhoods. There is thus very little social interaction between people of different religions - just a memory that they were once one. This kind of social segregation dates back to the introduction of the world religions in Southeast Maluku at the end of the nineteenth century. This was also the time when the highly extractive and bureaucratic colonial state of the Netherlands Indies was first established here. Religion is a state concept. Its introduction and maintenance has always been a policy of the state. Throughout the New Order, anyone who was not religious was an enemy of the state - a communist. Religion invokes political issues. For Kei Islanders it is not just an inspiration for peace but also a political inspiration. The political institutionalisation of religion takes on fearful forms - it is the institutionalisation of fear. The communist issue is taken very seriously. They do believe in religion, but in practice it becomes too serious and heavy. Religion is an initial barrier that must be overcome before Kei Islanders can interact more deeply. Religion is competitive. In colonial times power was distributed according to religion. Under the New Order the rhetoric was secular, but in reality religion remained important in determing who became district head or chairperson of the local assembly. The moment that central power experienced melt-down was therefore also the moment when competition spun totally out of control. Everyone knows everyone else in a small community. But rumours immediately began to circulate of impending attacks from another community in a neighbouring village or island. As long as the Big Brother state was in charge, such outside attacks were impossible to imagine, although they did happen. There are always long-standing problems between neighbouring villages - whether it is over land or an unpaid bride price. Indonesia provided a kind of imperial peace that dampened inter-village warfare. Ambon, the provincial capital 600 kilometres to the west, had always been the model of statecraft. No village head could be appointed without the approval of the governor in Ambon. The social segregation in Tual was very like that in Ambon too. So when Ambon descended into chaos, so did Tual. Suddenly people lost confidence in the 'guarantees of security' provided by the village head to protect those belonging to a minority faith. If someone heard a rumour that the village would be attacked, they just fled. Everyone was suddenly on the stage, acting out a script of Christian-Muslim warfare that had been written in Ambon. Of course they all knew what inter-religious tension was, but they never imagined it could come to war. There was a kind of stage fever driven by extreme fear, as well as by a sense of exhiliration, that turned into real violence. Kinship However, the conflict did not sever all social relationships. It did not make a complete break in history. There were still some relationships across the religious divide, and especially within local communities. In that sense the conflict was a superficial one, although it had a big local impact. It really wasn't 'themselves' up there on the stage. After a time they came to their senses, and got down to become spectators again. It became a kind of game once more - even if things were not the same because of the refugees and the dead. I don't believe there were hundreds of dead. In 'my' village of Ohoitel there were just eight dead. Talking numbers was part of the escalation of war. Even one is too many. There were also many stories of people helping one another across religious barriers. They said 'we are all one' - 'Ain Ni Ain'. When Kei Islanders remember their golden age of enlightenment they do not mean the coming of religion, but the creation of their customary law, the larvul ngabal. The historical watershed for them was not the coming of the Dutch, or of the Republic of Indonesia, or of religion, but much longer ago than that. They have long regarded Tanimbar Kei, a small island in the south, as the last stronghold of Kei custom and beliefs. During the conflict, this island became a sanctuary for refugees of all religions. The resurgent belief in the efficacy of custom led to a revived interest in the remaining customary leaders who had not been coopted by the New Order. The key role in turning back to a history of customary kinship was played by Bapak Raja J P Rahail, the customary king of Watlar. Raja Rahail began by preventing any rioting in his own kampung. In the hierarchy of local raja he was the most junior of the twelve in the Kei Islands, but he was able to approach the others and start a movement of customary reconciliation. Throughout the New Order, Raja Rahail had always been outside the system. He was something of a symbol of opposition to it. He revived the customary community known as the ratskap (from the Dutch 'raadschap'). Raja Rahail was close to the NGO community - being one of the chairpersons of the archipelago-wide customary association Aman (Asosiasi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), as well as of an Asia-wide association since the early 1990s. The 1979 law on village government (no 5/1979) had totally destroyed village autonomy. But Raja Rahail had succeeded in retaining custom in his ratskap of Maur Ohoiwut, and this was an inspiration for the community that lived there. The ratskap consisted of several villages, with different religions. So there were two models of community in Southeast Maluku. One shaped by Indonesia, which bound together religions through the distribution of patronage in the form of official appointments. This experienced melt-down and violence in 1999. As a consequence, people once more began to look to another model, one based on custom and local autonomy. Even though Raja Rahail was only relatively junior - not in age, he was about seventy years old and in fact died in November 2001 - but his statecraft became a model for the others when they saw how he was able to manage conflict. Raja Rahail had only his authority and his prestige to offer. He was an expert in creating consultative mechanisms. Every year he held a great debate, a musyawarah, in his ratskap. This had been running since the early 1990s assisted by various non-government organisations (NGOs). He inspired Kei Islanders with the idea that they belonged to one community, and that peace depended on the people's initiative. This played a significant role in ending the conflict in Southeast Maluku. P M Laksono (laksono@ugm.ac.id) teaches anthropology at Gadjah Mada University. His book 'The common ground in the Kei Islands' (Yogyakarta: Galang Press) appeared in March 2002 (see Bookshop page). Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Celebrate for peace

Reclaiming public ritual can help resolve conflict Taufik Rahzen When Herb Feith and I first met in 1984 I was reading a book on Gandhian non-violence by Rajni Kothari entitled A step into the future. Herb was astonished to find an Indonesian reading this. I found it in a flea market. That was the beginning of a long friendship. His ideas made us change the focus of the student discussion group I was leading then, from 'technology and philosophy' to 'peace'. This was the first group of its kind after the repression of 1978. In 1985 we held a Peace Camp at Parangtritis Beach near Yogya. It was attended by students from all over Java. We wore black as a protest against the military. Very symbolic. Then we restarted the student press network, which the military had destroyed because of student protests against Suharto. Then in February 1989 the Lampung massacre occurred, in which hundreds of Muslim villagers were shot in a military raid in rural southern Sumatra. We held a demonstration at Gadjah Mada University in protest. This was unheard of in those days and very dangerous. Actually it came out of an intense internal debate. Some students wanted to retaliate with violence. They spoke of urban guerrilla warfare. Others used the word 'non-violence'. Then I thought of the word 'anti-violence'. That became the theme of the protest, not just there but in other cities as well. The Tien Anmien massacre happened in Beijing in the same year, and this led to 'anti-violence' protests around Indonesia. These did not just oppose violence by the military, but also violence used by big business, violence suffered by women, violence to impose the Pancasila ideology, or any kind of violence to resolve conflict. I was asked to write an Anti-Violence Manifesto, which was published in Inside Indonesia (July 1989). Probably my most amazing experience was joining the Peace Camp in Iraq during the Gulf War early in 1991. There were 75 of us from many different countries, including three Indonesians, in tents in the desert on the border with Kuwait. Iraqi and US troops were visible on opposite sides. It was scary. I chickened out and went back to Baghdad. That was a bad choice. The first cruise missiles landed on government buildings right next to where we were camped! Herb Feith gave me travel money, but it was only enough for a one-way ticket. So I traveled travel back overland. I was a year on the road, learning how the Muslim world felt about the Gulf War and writing for the Indonesian media. That war destroyed all ideology for me. Ritual The 1998 protests that brought down Suharto were another moment when anti-violence ideas were strong. However, I myself had moved on by that time. Already in our student discussion group of the mid-1980s we wondered why all ideological experiments in Indonesia seemed to end in violence. Religion was the same. Romo Mangunwijaya used to say that the Indonesian character was amuk, like a volcano, that is, to be calm on the surface but then suddenly to explode. I have now lost all interest in ideology. The only thing that matters to me is how we can have a world without violence. How can people resolve their conflicts without discrimination, with complete respect for plurality and human potential? Every society has a dominant pattern of change. Here in Indonesia it is not ideology or rational knowledge, but ritual. The ceremony is the crucial ingredient in everything, from weddings to corruption and the economy. Ritual takes place in a public space and in public time, which is an extraordinary time. It belongs to everyone. All leaders use ritual - Sukarno, Suharto, Gus Dur, and Megawati. Clifford Geertz once wrote a book about the 'theatre state' in Bali. Ritual binds people together, and is therefore a method of resolving conflict. The regular sekaten celebration in Yogyakarta is a good example. The Balinese with their completely routine rituals are another. In Kutai, East Kalimantan, they have long had the Erau festival every September, to mark the moment when the sun is directly overhead. It is not just for Kutai Malays but for Dayak and Banjar people too. The problem is that the Erau festival was recently taken over by the local government and turned into a huge tourist attraction. This has been the case with ritual everywhere in Indonesia. The state dominates almost all public space and public time. It is no longer public, but Republic space and time! For example President Suharto made 23 June National Family Day just because it was the Javanese birthday of his wife Bu Tien. Peace-making In order to recover the peace-making potential of ritual, we have to reclaim that public space and time. My friends and I do that by reviving old rituals and festivals and investing them with new meaning or, more often, by making new, multi-cultural festivals. One of the best new festivals I became involved in was held in the traditional Balinese villages of Sidemen and Tirtagangga on 9/9/99. Four completely different groups came together here for a joint cultural performance. Besides the Sidemen Balinese, there were Papuans from Komoro, near the Freeport mine; Bissu, the transvestite priests from South Sulawesi; and people from Larantuka in Flores. The Balinese were Hindu, the Papuans Protestant, the Bissu Muslim, and the Florinese Catholic - not all of them equally orthodox mind you! They all experienced culture shock getting there. The Papuans lost all their dancing paraphernalia during the flight except a priceless statue they carried in their laps. The Florinese came on a ferryboat that was full of traumatised East Timor refugees. The Bissu were marginalised in their own society, and had never been outside South Sulawesi. None of them were fluent in Indonesian. To get them talking, the Balinese took them around to the rice fields, to see what Balinese eat. It worked. That night they held the performance together. It was very moving. At the end, the Florinese gave a hand-woven cloth to the Balinese, while the Balinese gave a wonderful mask to the Papuans. The Papuans gave their statue to the Bissu (instead of to the organisers as they had planned), and the Bissu gave one of their cloths to the Florinese. After the meeting, each group felt they were given fresh confidence to go home and do something creative. The Komoro dancers did a festival. The Bissu elected a new leader after letting it slip for thirty years! Another dream I have is to make a Culture Ship that travels around the eastern archipelago. Buildings are too static and Java-centric. People come to ships to trade. That is a good moment for a meeting between people, and for a celebration. Herb phoned me from the airport in Jakarta two days before he died. We shared our concern about the war in Afghanistan, and its implications for the Muslim world. 'Taufik', he said, 'we have to step into the future.' Taufik Rahzen lives in Bandung and directs the Indonesian Festival Alliance (Aliansi Indonesia Festival, Alif).  Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Do-it-yourself freedom

How to escape the mainstream, big money, newspaper thought police Alexandra Crosby While the mass media monster may appear to be growing stronger, fed on the fat of advertising and corporate sponsorship, new species of independent media are popping up in Yogyakarta. Angry about their lack of access to mainstream politics, and empowered by the 'do it yourself' philosophy, people are expressing their authentic thoughts and feelings by the cheapest print medium available, photocopied zines. Debu is a brand new zine launched in November, 2001. It is put together by an organisation of street musicians called Serikat Pengamen Indonesia (SPI), among whom is Ibob. SPI began creating their own media under the New Order regime. Before 1998, they made political pamphlets criticising the government and military and announcing actions. These were distributed as widely as possible at bus terminals and train stations. Ibob recalls this was a 'very repressive period... we could hardly move.' Underground media were being produced, but in a much more restricted form and not nearly in the quantities that they are today. SPI experienced constant intimidation from the military. As a protective mechanism, their material did not contain names or addresses which could be linked back to the group. The fall of Suharto in 1998 was a significant turning point. SPI now feels able to produce Debu, which openly identifies names, addresses, and contact details. However, intimidation still occurs. Members of SPI recently experienced violent repression from the military again, which leaves Ibob uneasy that this apparent 'opening up' of the political environment will not last. But while it does, Ibob sees alternative media as crucial for expressing radical ideas. 'We must take advantage of this opportunity while we can. Debu is is an expression and affirmation of our political strength and an assertion of our rights as urban poor.' Exi is part of a collective called anakseribupulau which makes a zine about environmental issues. He says that because there is no profit motive, alternative media can address important issues the mainstream media will not touch. Anakseribupulau (Children of a Thousand Isles) is produced with whatever money the collective can scrounge together at the time. No one is paid for their work or their time. There is no advertising, no business sponsors and no editorial selection. Although the result has more spelling mistakes than glossy photos, and has a circulation of just a few hundred, it is totally open to contributions. 'This,' Exi says proudly, 'is a free, independent medium.' Emma Emma makes a zine about gender equality called Kotak Komik. It is distributed through women's collectives as well as student and other activist networks. 'Mainstream media always support the status quo of capitalism and patriarchy. They never print writings or education directed toward ordinary people,' she complains. When asked whether mainstream media have the capacity to address issues of gender inequality, Emma was adamant that under a capitalist system this would be impossible. 'Under this system,' she goes on to say, 'ordinary people don't have access to the mainstream mass media because it is controlled by capital. So we must create our own media.' Emma sees zines as not only an alternative to the mass media, but to academic textbooks. She is unsatisfied with a lot of writing from the Left in Indonesia because it fails to encourage debate and criticism. Emma doesn't wish to put her energy into media which are out of the reach of most Indonesians. Ibob, Exi and Emma all agree, the problems with mainstream media are inseparable from those with gender inequality, the environment, and social injustice. Zines are a forum to educate ourselves about how we can live together on this earth without destroying it or each other. By creating media such as Anakseribupulau, Debu, and Kotak Komik, anybody who wants to, has the power to contribute to the debates which affect us all. When asked about the importance of alternative media in Indonesia today, Exi's response was emphatic. 'When faced with so much oppression, inequality, and injustice in the world, we have no choice but to speak out, in whatever way we can.' Michel Foucault once remarked, 'We are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.' Dissatisfaction with the mainstream media in Indonesia essentially reflects a rejection of the centralised powers which produce it. The emerging zine scene in Yogyakarta is an exciting development in a growing culture of resistance and criticism. Emma, Ibob, and Exi can all be contacted at kismiana2001@yahoo.com, debu_spi@lovemail.com , and anak_seribupulau@yahoo.com.au. Alexandra ('Sasha') Crosby (alicrosby@hotmail.com) was a student in Yogya with Acicis. She and her friends produced a zine called 'Arus'.   Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Revolution of hope

Independent films are young, free and radical Katinka van Heeren The voice of an old man singing a song of the time of Indonesia's struggle for independence, a song of pride, hope, and great expectations for the future. His singing is accompanied by the image of the Indonesian flag, SangMerah-Putih, the symbol of the nation's pride and glory. Yet, the flag is not blowing bravely and fiercely in the wind, but is weakly flapping around the flagpole, a symbol of the confusion and disappointment of so many in Indonesia today. This fragment is the last scene of the short Indie (independent) film Kepada yang terhormat titik 2 ('To the esteemed: '). It was produced in Purwokerto, Central Java, and had its premiere there on 18 January 2002. The film is an unpretentious account of how common people in Purwokerto see their municipality. It captures city life with a deliberately gritty touch, showing the lives of street vendors, street kids, and farmers. At the end, an old peasant recounts that throughout his life nothing Jakarta has done ever improved the meagre livelihood of Purwokerto farmers. Kepada yang terhormat titik 2 is part of a new development in Indonesian cinema. The spirit of reformasi in 1998 permeated into the Indonesian film scene and gave birth to a movement characterised by great diversity. The independent film has become an exciting and popular model for young Indonesians who want to make their own films. They have formed a community of so-called Mafin (Mahluk Film Independen, Independent Film Creatures), which holds its own film festivals. They exchange ideas on the subject of film on the internet and at get-togethers. The independent film movement really began with the film Kuldesak ('Cul-de-sac'). This anthology of four short features dealt with the problems of middle class Jakarta youth - drugs, homosexuality, and the feeling of absolute desolation. Its four young filmmakers decided in 1996 to produce an 'underground' film that broke free of all the rules of film production under the censorious New Order. Despite the freer political climate, one of the most radical scenes of this film, two boys kissing in a bus, was censored. It appeared to be too revolutionary even for reformasi. Today these four have become leading filmmakers, producing national successes - Petualangan Sherina by Mira Lesmana and Riri Riza, Jelangkung by Rizal Mantovani - and even an international one - Pasir berbisik by Nan T Achnas. Rebellious The unexpected fall of Suharto enabled this film to reach movie theatres throughout Indonesia in November 1998. Reformasi was reaching its peak, and many restrictions on film production and exhibition were not being applied. Its rebellious production and fresh contents and techniques set Kuldesak apart from both the films produced by an earlier generation and from the everyday soap operas on television. The press labelled it the first-ever Indonesian 'independent' film, and often highlighted its 'non-Indonesian' features. The film was highly successful among young audiences. In several cities ticket counter queues stretched into the street. Kuldesak, made by four filmmakers who 'just went for it', triggered a euphoric energy among other aspiring young Indonesians. The freer political climate encouraged a sense of freedom and creativity. Also important was the wide availability of new audio-visual technologies such as digital video cameras and projectors. In 1999 the Community of Independent Film (Komunitas Film Independen, or Konfiden) began to hold a series of film screenings and discussions in the bigger cities of Java. The objective was to introduce the concept of independent film to a wider public. They were also a warm-up for the first Indonesian Independent Film and Video Festival (FFVII), held in Jakarta at the end of October 1999. This festival aimed to provide independent filmmakers with a forum to screen their films. More ambitiously, it hoped to revive Indonesian film as a whole, which had virtually died in the last decade of New Order rule. The film industry had collapsed under the combined weight of three factors. Restrictive rules were becoming ever more draconian. Secondly, a business group owned by Suharto's relative Sudwikatmono (Subentra's Studio 21 chain of quality cinemas) disadvantaged local films by showing almost exclusively Hollywood. And thirdly, soapies made for the new commercial TV stations since the early 1990s proved to be highly popular. Since that year, a similar festival has been held annually - this year will be the fourth. Konfiden now also organises filmmaking workshops, publishes a monthly bulletin, and is developing a permanent cinema laboratory in Jakarta where new filmmakers can come to learn. Meanwhile, others also formed matching communities in several cities in Java, Lampung (southern Sumatra), Makassar, Palu (also in Sulawesi), and in Bali. These organise their own festivals, complete with discussions, workshops, and bulletins. Generally speaking the films screened are rather unsophisticated and inexperienced in their technique. However, the topics are often stimulating and original. Many include maverick ideas. One example of a very popular indie film is Revolusi harapan ('Revolution of hope'), by Nanang Istiabudi. This is a surrealistic story about a gang of thugs who go out on command to kill and pull the teeth of artists, students, and others who are in any way critical. Dunia kami, duniaku, dunia mereka ('Our world, my world, their world'), by Adi Nugroho, narrates the life of a transvestite in Yogyakarta. And Kameng Gampoeng Nyang Keunong Geulawa ('The village goat takes the beating'), by Aryo Danusiri, is a chilling testament of survivors of torture inflicted by the Indonesian Special Forces Kopassus. It was filmed in Tiro, northern Aceh. As members of the various communities discovered each other on the internet and began to visit each other's festivals, they began to think about a coalition. About a hundred people from all over Indonesia came together in Yogyakarta for the National Indie Film Festival late May and early June 2001. At the end, after great deliberation, they decided to form a national affiliation of independent film communities. The next step was to establish an information centre (ICE). It operated an internet mailing list called Forum Film, coordinated out of Yogyakarta. They also planned to hold a national meeting every two months. On 26 August 2001, during the BatuIndieFilmmakerMitting held in Batu (a resort near Malang in East Java), the various communities tried to formulate a collective vision. They wanted a program to acquaint a broader public with the medium of film in general, and 'film independen' in particular. After an all-night debate, three new ICE divisions were set up. In addition to the earlier Forum Film mailing list, a web site was to be coordinated from Malang, and an archive and a publication division were begun in Jakarta. The four ICE divisions would each remain autonomous bodies, standing for the same ideal but free to formulate their own policies. For example, the publication division has taken the shape of a new organisation called Terapis (Terapi Sinema, cinema therapy). It will publish books, a magazine, and a bulletin, and intends to organise workshops and seminars as well as produce educational films. Local pride One reason why the independent film movement has adopted the form of a national alliance, in which the different communities remain 'independent' and have an equal say, is the fear of domination by Jakarta. This fear, a New Order legacy, has had a positive spin-off. Many new independent films try to reflect the characteristics of their home region. The filmmakers want to make something that differs in every sense from a film that would have been produced in Jakarta - something that carries local pride and joy. For example, Di antara masa lalu dan masa sekarang ('Between the past and the present', by Eddie Cahyono) is the reflections of an old man about the guerrilla struggle for independence, and Topeng kekasih ('Mask of love', by Hanung Bramantyo) is entirely in Javanese and concerns the Oedipus Complex. Both these films depict a typical Yogyakarta atmosphere. Ah sialan ('Oh shit', by Danis) is about the problems of student life in Malang. Kepada yang terhormat titik 2, made by Dimas Jayasrana and Bastian, students at the Jenderal Soedirman University in rural Purwokerto and premiered in the same city, is another creative manifestation of this feeling. Katinka van Heeren (cvanheeren@hotmail.com) is writing a PhD dissertation at Leiden University, the Netherlands. Websites: www.konfiden.or.id www.forum-film@yahoogroups.com, email: terapis terapis@cinephiles.net. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

BP and the Tangguh test

A multi-billion dollar gas project in a remote Papuan bay needs scrutiny Down to Earth In recent years BP - the world's third largest oil group - has become recognised in industry circles as one of the greenest and most socially responsible energy multinationals. It is 'pro-engagement': the company courts NGO opinion, funds conservation organisations and has signed various agreements committing it to respect human rights and protect the environment. The company claims green credentials by investing in solar power and cutting greenhouse gas emissions within its own operations. NGOs and communities with direct experience of BP's operations see another side of BP which clashes with the public image. BP has been accused of collusion in human rights abuses in Colombia and has clashed with indigenous forest-dwellers in Venezuela's Orinoco delta. Further controversy has focused on projects and investments in Angola, Tibet, Sudan and Alaska. These all point to a yawning gap between words and deeds. The company insists its new Tangguh liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in West Papua's Bintuni Bay should not be judged by past projects - but what other concrete evidence is there to go on? It is also worth looking at BP's main partner in the Tangguh project. This is Pertamina, the notoriously corrupt state-owned oil company which has a dirty record on human rights too. Pertamina is in partnership with Exxon Mobil in Aceh where troops paid to guard the gas installations have committed a series of well-documented human rights abuses. For the people living in villages around Bintuni Bay BP's project will mean irreversible change. Over 500 people will be moved from their homes in Tanah Merah to a newly created village 3.5 km to the west in Saengga. Forests will be cut - with resulting loss of resources and biodiversity. Gas platforms, pipelines, processing plant, port facilities, airstrip and employee accommodation will be built on the 3,416 ha project site. In Bintuni Bay, shipping will increase and local fishing activities will be disrupted. There will be an influx of outsiders as workers are brought in to construct the facilities. Many of the changes to the physical environment can be predicted and plans can be drawn up to minimise some of the negative effects. This is what BP is attempting to do through the environmental impact analysis (Andal) process. But other changes are not so easily foreseen. These include the key question of security at the site - and arrangements for guarding the site will depend on external, factors outside the company's control. Human rights There is great concern that the Indonesian military (TNI) will initiate conflict in nearby areas in order to justify the need for a strong security presence at the site. Villagers have expressed fear about the military in various meetings with BP staff. People in Sidomakmur, for example, a village that lies within what BP describes as the 'indirectly affected area', were 'very concerned that the Tangguh Project might use the military in their operations. They have had experiences with the military guarding the sawmill and logging operations'. Last year's military repression in Wasior, in which ten people were killed, others 'disappeared' and many homes burned down, has already been linked to the Tangguh project. Papuan observers point out that the killing of five police mobile brigade (Brimob) officers which sparked intensive military operations in Wasior, was timed to coincide with the visit of the British Ambassador to the region in June last year. The implied intention was to send a strong message to BP that they cannot do without the 'help' of the security forces. For the TNI, big projects have always meant big opportunities for extra pay to guard project sites - a situation that has led to a sharp increase in the incidence of human rights abuses - at the Freeport/ Rio Tinto mine in West Papua and at Exxon Mobil's gas installations in Aceh. In the Bintuni Bay area itself, there is already a Brimob presence which has had negative consequences for local people. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Djayanti Group, which has timber, plantations and fishing interests in Bintuni Bay, pays a 20-man police detachment 'to enforce land grabs from local residents.' When confronted with questions on security, BP staff insist they want to reduce dependence on the military - at one stage the idea of creating a 'military-free zone' at Tangguh was floated. The company's 'Community Development Strategy' document says that trust and acceptance by the local community will be crucial: 'We pledge to work with Pertamina to ensure critical national resources are protected primarily through our acceptance by the local populace as a responsible, and welcome member of the community; thus eliminating the need for extraordinary efforts by security forces to preserve and protect people and facilities.' How BP will deal with military opposition to this plan has not been publicly outlined yet. This is one of the issues that BP's human rights impacts study should be looking at. The study is being conducted by Bennett Freeman, a member of the Clinton administration's state department staff, contracted by BP. Freeman was one of the main architects of the US/ UK Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights which BP signed up for. Before leaving for West Papua, he contacted the UK-based NGO, Tapol and was keen to find out who, if not the TNI, would be suitable candidates for guarding the facilities. The possibility of 'buying off' the TNI was also raised. The price may be high. The security forces are in a strong position to make demands and there is very little political will on the part of President Megawati to exercise any meaningful control over the military. The so-called 'security approach' used by president Suharto for dealing with unrest in West Papua and other trouble spots is back in vogue under Megawati, after her predecessor's attempts at dialogue were thwarted. In November Megawati's senior minister for political and security affairs, Bambang Yudhoyono Susilo, announced that a further 32,500 police and soldiers would be sent to conflict areas including West Papua and Aceh. The following month, Megawati said the military should 'be firm in carrying out their job and not to be worried about accusations of human rights abuses'. Unlike other companies operating in West Papua, BP has made some effort to communicate its project plans to local communities and consult villagers on impacts, resettlement and compensation. It is far from clear, however, that communities have all the information and opportunities for dialogue that they want, as there are already signs of dissatisfaction. Over the resettlement of Tanah Merah, BP acknowledges that despite 'substantial upgrades to their current situation' being planned, the resettlement still has 'the potential for dissatisfaction.' The villagers have not been informed when they will be moved - a situation that is leading to some frustration, according to Indonesia's mining advocacy network, Jatam. The community is also very concerned about the prospects of pollution from the BP site threatening their shrimp, crab, fish and mangrove resources on which their livelihoods depend. The issue of compensation is causing resentment too: land rates set in 1997 by the local government, were as low as Rp15 - Rp30 per square metre. (Rp10,300 = US$1.) Despite BP's commitment to transparency, not all available information has been made public. A large document containing the Terms of Reference for the Environmental Impact Analysis which BP head office assured NGOs was available as a public document, turns out not to be public after all. (DTE has obtained a copy of this document.) It is important that all information - including the results of the human rights impact study - is made accessible to communities affected by the project and the NGOs working with them, if BP really wants to be perceived differently from other investors. Codes of conduct The British government's very public support for Tangguh reflects a high level of confidence in Indonesia's investment opportunities. According to British energy minister Brian Wilson, Britain was Indonesia's biggest investor in the oil/ gas sector in the year 2000 and second largest overall after Japan. Over the last thirty years Britain has invested more than any other country apart from the US in the oil/ gas sector. Wilson, who visited Indonesia in November last year, said that BP had committed to a total of US$11 billion in investments, with $1.9 billion in current capital to be spent on Indonesian projects, including Tangguh. In total BP planned to invest $3-4 billion developing Tangguh.'We continue to see great opportunities for cooperation in energy', he said. Business codes of conduct or business principles have been developed by multinational companies, NGOs, governments and international bodies such as the UN agencies, and the EU in response to public pressure for companies to be socially and environmentally responsible. While many of the objectives in these codes are positive, their main drawback is that they are voluntary. There are no sanctions if the principles are not followed and there is no independent outside body to monitor compliance. Indigenous communities attending a meeting on mining in London last year argued that voluntary initiatives are not acceptable. A statement drawn up by participants said: 'In recent years the mining industry has become more aggressive and sophisticated in manipulating national and international laws and policies to suit its interests. The mining laws of more than seventy countries have been changed in the past two decades. Laws protecting indigenous peoples and the environment are undermined.' 'For this reason NGOs supporting indigenous groups want "politically and legally enforceable measures that will hold the mining industry accountable, above all to mining and exploration-affected communities.' (London Declaration 20/Sep/01) Down to Earth (email dte@gn.apc.org, web www.gn.apc.org/dte) is the UK-based international campaign for ecological justice in Indonesia. Extracted with permission from its February 2002 newsletter (DtE 52). Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

The life and death of Theys Eluay

The murdered Papuan leader was an ambiguous figure At Ipenburg There was always something ambiguous about Theys Hiyo Eluay. He became a focal point in the struggle for Papuan independence. But he was also seen as close to top army and police commanders, and the Kopassus special forces were his friends. Theys did not have much support in his home area of Sentani, outside Jayapura, where memories were still vivid of the large number of people killed through him by the Indonesian army. Theys Eluay was educated in the 'advanced primary school' (Jongensvervolgschool) in Yoka, Sentani, in the Dutch colonial period. He studied meteorology and later worked as an assistant meteorologist. He came from a family of traditional heads (ondoafi) in Sere village. Although not entitled to the responsibility, he became ondoafi himself because of his relatively advanced education. After the Dutch relinquished power in 1963, Indonesia tried to eliminate Papuan protest against its integration into Indonesia. Theys assisted the army by pointing out people who were pro-Dutch and anti-Indonesian. This action caused many victims in the small Sentani community of about 15,000. Some are still in hiding in PNG. Theys was one of about 1,000 Papuans selected to vote for integration with Indonesia in 1969. He campaigned in favour of a positive vote. In 1971 Theys became a member of the provincial parliament. However, by 1980 his influence had declined. This made him feel frustrated. He joined the officially sponsored Papuan Customary Council Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Papua), first for the Sentani area and then for the province of Irian Jaya. In 1990 he became chairman of the provincial council. After 1996 this council became more politicised. Morning Star In October 1998 Theys Eluay, Don Flassy, and two students were arrested for holding meetings to discuss the raising of the Morning Star flag on 1 December 1998. When Theys was freed after a week, he appeared on the front page of the Cendrawasih Pos, stating that West Papua did not need to ask for independence as it had already been independent ever since 1 December 1961. The Papuans, he said, only wanted their sovereignty back. This interview highlighting Theys was a strong contrast with previous editorial policy, which had ignored independence demands. The focus on Theys continued, and certainly increased the circulation of Cendrawasih Pos, the only province-wide daily. Other leaders in the struggle, like Tom Beanal or Herman Awom, were rarely featured. There were weeks when Theys was pictured almost every day on the front page. 'Theys is weeping', 'Theys is angry', the headlines said. 'Theys is sick and has to go to Singapore', and 'Friends at once' (after fetching the new military commander from the Sentani airport). All this increased Theys' popularity enormously. He had the courage to say things other people were afraid to say in the open. Yet all the time Theys remained very close to the top of the army and police. He was the customary (adat) leader, and now also the Great Leader of the Papuans. As such he was accepted into the select group of the most powerful in the province. The rise of Theys Eluay started soon after the Team of One Hundred had gone to Jakarta to meet President Habibie, in January 1999. Afterwards the team announced, without a single dissenting voice, that the result of the dialogue initiated by Habibie was that Papuans wanted independence. The mobilisation in favour of independence had been done by Foreri, the Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for the Reconciliation of the Papuan People). This was an initiative of church leaders, joined by adat leaders, students and women's organisations. Theys Eluay, Tom Beanal and Gaspar Sibi were the adat leaders. Theys was a self-appointed leader. He began to call himself Great Leader of the Papuan People some time in 1998. He proposed the Morning Star flag be raised after his birthday celebration on 12 November 1998. In reaction, the army said they would create a bloodbath if the forbidden flag should be raised. Theys then cancelled the event, saying that December was the month when the Prince of Peace was born and no violence should take place. In 1999 Theys again announced a flag raising for 1 December, but then again wanted to cancel it. This time, however, his followers strongly resisted the cancellation. So Theys supported the flag raising. The army and police, after a visit to Irian Jaya by the national police chief, insisted it was illegal. Nevertheless, on 1 December 1999 people throughout the province raised the forbidden flag. This was a major achievement. Order was maintained by the pro-independence militia known as Satgas Papua. Papuans saw that independence was possible, and that they were still a majority in their own land. Most migrants preferred to stay at home, so on that one day Papuans dominated the streets, an unusual experience. In September 1999 Theys proposed to hold a Great Meeting (Rapat Akbar) to give voice to 'M' (merdeka, independence). The idea spread, and in February 2000 a Great Debate (Musyawarah Besar, Mubes) was held to discuss the future of West Papua and to determine a strategy for the independence struggle. The Free Papua Movement (OPM) was also present. However, Theys had by then a large force of young people at his own disposal - the Papua Task Force (Satgas Papua). They were responsible for security at the Mubes. Actually the majority wanted Tom Beanal to chair the Mubes, but with such a large number of satgas close by, Theys could not be ignored. A compromise was struck, and both became 'Great Leaders of the Papuan People'. The Mubes decided to organise a congress with a wider representation than the Mubes. The Second Papuan Congress took place in May-June 2000. Theys stood up at the beginning of the meeting and said: 'I am the chairman, while you are the vice chairman, right?' Tom tacitly agreed, as he did not want a quarrel at the beginning of such an important congress. Unity was crucial. The Presidium of the Council of Papuans (Presidium Dewan Papua, PDP) got a mandate to act on behalf of all Papuans. It was asked to report on progress towards independence by 1 December 2000. The provincial and national governments accepted the PDP as representing Papuan opinion. However, as PDP chairman Theys usually did not consult his fellow members. They often knew what Theys was doing only by reading the papers. For one of them, Benny Giay from Paniai, it became too much when Theys in October 2000 honoured the departing army commander by elevating him to the rank of 'Great Warrior of the Papuans'. Papuans from the highlands said they would not raise funds and pigs for somebody who had been ordering the killing of Papuans. Benny Giay then left the PDP. Achievements Theys had many achievements. He had the flair and courage to make statements the people understood. He raised an awareness of being Papuan. He supported the formation of 'command posts' (pos komando, posko) to guard villages and even cities. This came in response to the situation in the Moluccas, where outside provocateurs stirred up a religious conflict. These posko were very popular. They were built all over the province, and effectively took over control from the army and police. The police later dismantled them. The Satgas Papua was also immensely popular. Theys Eluay controlled a small army of about 5,000 young men and women, led by his son Boy Eluay. They got some training, and were easily recognised by their black T-shirts and trousers. The satgas gave a purpose to marginalised young Papuans who had fallen victim to alcoholism and petty crime. He also from the beginning spoke out for peaceful means. Appealing to the Papuan religious heritage, he said prayer was to be their weapon. All over the province continuous prayer sessions were held. Through Theys the Papuans became more united. At the same time, Papuans distrusted his good relationships with those they saw as their oppressors. Was Theys a spy, a provocateur? Or was he double spy, also cheating the army, Kopassus and the police? In either case, Theys was playing with fire. Radical highland Papuans twice threatened Theys with death if he should back down over the flag raising issue - in 1999 and 2000. Theys may have underestimated the danger of any double play. Or he may have allowed the army and the police to use him, just like he accepted the support of Yorris Raweyai, head of the pro-Suharto Pemuda Pancasila youth organisation. Yorris was in turn supported by Tomy Winata, a businessman with Kopassus connections. Tomy also had business interests in Irian Jaya. In return, Theys possibly thought of getting immunity for his political activity of mobilising Papuan awareness. His natural skill in public relations made him popular with the press. Soon every man and woman in the streets of Java knew about the Papuan struggle. His dramatic and unexpected death on 10 November 2001 fascinated a lot of people in Indonesia and abroad. Theys, it seems, died at the hands of the very people who just before had honoured him publicly as the Great Leader and Hero of the Papuan Struggle. He and his driver considered these people their personal friends. In the theology in which Theys believed, to die for a cause is nothing strange. It was what Jesus did. He had intimated to close friends that he was prepared to die for the cause. In the end Theys meant more for the struggle because of his death. In his death he united all the factions. He became a symbol for the absence of law that threatens every Papuan. He became a hero in the line of Arnold Ap, executed in 1984, and Thomas Wainggai, reputedly killed in 1996. At Ipenburg (ipen@jayapura.wasantara.net.id) is graduate program director at the I S Kijne theological college in Jayapura. Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

Indonesia - US military ties

September 11th and after Kurt Biddle 'Every lame duck political idea that couldn't get any mileage in the past ten years, has now been repackaged in light of the events of September 11th and is now being sold under the guise of anti-terrorism.' - Congressional staffer September 11th has changed our world. That's true, but not everything has changed. Tensions that began in the early 1990s between Congress and the Pentagon over aid to the Indonesian military continue. Only the Pentagon's justifications have changed. And the Indonesian military is just as brutal as ever. US-Indonesian military ties were first restricted after the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, East Timor, in which more than 270 people were killed by Indonesian troops with US-supplied weapons. The massacre prompted human rights groups and activists to demand that Congress sanction the Indonesian military (TNI). Consequently, the US Congress restricted most military aid to Indonesia by refusing to fund the International Military and Training (IMET) program for TNI personnel in October 1992. In July 1993, after years of unrestricted weapons transfers to Indonesia, the State Department, under congressional pressure, blocked a transfer of US F-5 fighter planes from the Jordan to Indonesia, citing human rights as one of the reasons. In 1994, the State Department banned the sale of small and light arms and riot control equipment to Indonesia. In 1995, Congress restored some military training funding under the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program, which purports to be an 'educational program' briefing officers on issues of human rights, military justice and civilian control of the military. In June 1997, then-Indonesian president Suharto wrote to President Clinton rejecting E-IMET and a proposed sale of F-16 jet fighters. Suharto stated that he would not accept restrictions on military transfers based on human rights. Throughout the 1990s the Pentagon clearly violated Congressional intent and continued to train Indonesian special forces troops (Kopassus) in urban guerilla warfare, surveillance, sniper marksmanship and 'psychological operations' tactics. In March 1998, the existence of this JCET (Joint Combined Exchange Training) program was publicised by Congressional allies of the East Timor Action Network (ETAN), who fought for and won an end to such training to the TNI. East Timor When Indonesian military, police and their militia proxies razed East Timor after the referendum vote in August 1999, then-President Clinton was forced by public outrage to ban all joint military exercises and commercial arms sales. Later that year Congress put part of this ban into law. The 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act renewed those conditions, which must be met before normal military ties can be restored. These include the return of refugees to East Timor, and accountability for military and militia members responsible for human rights atrocities in East Timor and Indonesia. They also require Indonesia to actively prevent militia incursions into East Timor and to cooperate fully with the UN administration in East Timor. The President is required to certify to Congress that the conditions have been met. The scorecard on the conditions isn't good. The incursions into East Timor have stopped, although January's UN Secretary General's report on Untaet said that 'hard-line militia may still pose a long-term threat.' According to the UN, there remain sixty to seventy thousand refugees in West Timor. One of the most important remaining issues is accountability. The Indonesian military and police along with their milita proxies killed thousands of East Timorese people, burned towns to the ground, destroyed eighty percent of the half-island's infrastructure and forced or led more than a quarter of a million villagers into Indonesian-ruled West Timor. The international community will be watching the long-awaited and much-delayed trial in Indonesia, but it seems few have much hope that it will bring justice. September 11th Just eight days after the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri kept a previously scheduled appointment with President Bush. In the short meeting, Bush promised to lift the embargo on commercial sales of non-lethal military items. Indonesian military officials and much of the Indonesian press thought that Megawati had scored a victory in restoring military ties. Many speculated that Bush was offering Megawati a recruitment bonus to join his coalition against terrorism. But in an off-the-record conversation, a White House official explained that the package Bush presented to Megawati was completed on September 10th, and not a word was changed after the events of the next day. Much of what Bush promised Megawati was from the administration's review of US-Indonesian military ties policy that had taken place over the northern summer. Bush is limited to what military support he can offer Indonesia, since most of the money for training and equipment is restricted by Congress. Mega's visit was highly symbolic: the president of the world's most populous predominantly Muslim nation comes to Washington. Megawati would be useful to Bush in building his new coalition, demonstrating that a war on terrorism wouldn't be a war on Islam. But Megawati's trip was plagued before she even left Jakarta by Vice President Hamzah Haz' comments on his hopes that the September 11th attacks 'can cleanse the sins by the US.' (Later, Megawati's own comments criticising the US war in Afghanistan further angered many in Washington.) Now that the Congressional appropriations cycle has finished, we see a mixed Washington policy towards the Indonesian military. In the 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Congress renewed and bolstered the ban on training and funding of the TNI. What originally were six conditions were expanded to seven. Congress saw that the military was acting in much the same brutal way towards people still within Indonesia's borders, so the conditions were reassessed. For example, because the UN relinquishes sovereignty to East Timor's government this May, the Congress dropped the condition of complying with the UN Transitional Administration. The new conditions include releasing political detainees (activists serving prison time include Faisal Syamsuddin, chair of the Jakarta chapter of the Aceh Referendum Information Center SIRA); allowing the UN and other international humanitarian organisations and representatives of recognised human rights organisations access to conflict areas such as Aceh, West Papua, Maluku and West Timor; and demonstrating a commitment to civilian control of the armed forces by reporting to civilian authorities audits of expenditures of the armed forces. An audit of TNI finances is a key condition for accountability and civilian control. The International Crisis Group estimates that just 30% of the TNI's budget comes from Jakarta, the rest of the money is through the military's own fund-raising efforts, from both legal and illegal businesses. Human rights advocates argue that if civilians do not control the purse strings of the TNI, civilians will not have control of the military. Conditions regarding accountability and return of refugees to East Timor remained part of the law. However, in a last minute move while finalising the Defence Department Appropriations Act, Senator Daniel Inouye (a Democrat from Hawaii) inserted language appropriating US$17.9 million to establish a Regional Defence Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program at the behest of Admiral Dennis C Blair, Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command (CINCPAC). The new program contains no restrictions on which countries can participate, thereby allowing training for Indonesia. Both men have long opposed existing congressional bans on training for the TNI. US battlefield? The Pentagon seems to be chomping at the bit for military involvement in Indonesia. One of the most vocal advocates for military ties with Indonesia is Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, a US ambassador to Indonesia for three years during the Reagan administration. He has repeatedly argued that Washington should help Indonesia fight terrorists. Wolfowitz told the Far Eastern Economic Review, 'Going after Al Qaeda in Indonesia is not something that should wait until after Al Qaeda has been uprooted from Afghanistan.' It remains to be seen if and how the US will be involved in Indonesia, but with 600 US military 'advisers' on the ground in the neighbouring Philippines, some see Indonesia as the next battlefield. Many at the Pentagon and in the administration call the TNI the only viable institution in Indonesia. Admiral Blair claims he wants the same goals as Congress does for the TNI, but disagrees with congressional methods. He argues that 'engagement' will teach the Indonesian military to respect democracy, human rights and civilian control. But the TNI hasn't met the basic conditions that Congress passed into law before training can resume. For years the Pentagon trained and equipped the Indonesian military, but this contact certainly did not instill the TNI with a respect for human rights. The military terrorises their own population every day. Over 1,800 were killed in Aceh last year, and the military committed more killing in West Papua, including what appears to be the Kopassus assassination of Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay in November 2001. TNI atrocities show no sign of abating. Unless the Indonesian military is placed fully under civilian control (including budget and command), stays out of politics (and not just when it is convenient for their goals), focuses on external defence, and stops committing human rights abuses - in other words, becomes a professional military - the US must not support them. The US should focus on helping civil society groups build Indonesia's democracy, and not hinder democracy by supporting a military that is both corrupt and brutal. Kurt Biddle (kurt@IndonesiaNetwork.org) is Washington coordinator for the Indonesia Human Rights Network (http:www.indonesianetwork.org). Inside Indonesia 70: Apr - Jun 2002

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