Articles - Inside Indonesia: The peoples and cultures of Indonesia

One less place to hide

US courts bring down judgments against two Indonesian generals John M Miller Only two ranking Indonesian officers have been held accountable in any meaningful sense for human rights abuses in East Timor so far. In both cases, it was not a court in Indonesia or East Timor, but courts in the United States that issued the judgments in civil cases brought by victims or their relatives. In 1994, a Boston court held General Sintong Panjaitan liable for US$14 million for his involvement in the November 12, 1991 massacre of over 270 East Timorese at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Helen Todd, the mother of the only non-East Timorese killed that day, sued Panjaitan. Judge Patti Saris ordered that Gen Panjaitan, who was commander of the Bali-based Udayana military command at the time of the massacre, to pay $4 million in compensatory damages to Todd and $10 million in punitive damages in the shooting death of her 20-year-old son Kamal Bamadhaj. Last September, Judge Alan Kay of the US District Court in Washington, DC, ruled that General Johny Lumintang was liable for US$66 million in damages for his role in crimes against humanity following East Timor's vote for independence in 1999. That lawsuit was brought on behalf of six East Timorese plaintiffs. The judge granted $10 million in punitive damages to each plaintiff or their estates. Compensatory damages ranged from $750,000 to $1.75 million each. 'It has been established... that Lumintang has responsibility for the actions against plaintiffs and a larger pattern of gross human rights violations,' wrote Judge Kay. '[H]e - along with other high-ranking members of the Indonesian military - planned, ordered, and instigated acts carried out by subordinates to terrorise and displace the East Timorese population ... and to destroy East Timor's infrastructure following the vote for independence.' In 1999, Lumintang, as Deputy Army Chief of Staff, was second in command of the Indonesian army. In his ruling, Judge Kay cited the principle of command responsibility, where 'a commander may be criminally or civilly responsible for crimes committed by subordinates.' He said that Lumintang is 'both directly and indirectly responsible for human rights violations committed against' the plaintiffs. Evidence of direct involvement includes his signature on certain key documents calling for the use of torture and removal of large numbers of people in East Timor if the people voted for independence in the 1999 referendum. Lumintang was also found liable because, as a member of the TNI high command, he knew or should have known that subordinates were involved in systematic rights violations in East Timor, but he failed to act to prevent them or punish the violators. The alternatives Although courts are currently sitting in Dili and Jakarta, the case against Lumintang is the only one heard to date against a senior Indonesian commander for the systematic destruction following East Timor's 1999 referendum. Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court has been widely criticised for its limited jurisdiction and the poor quality of its judges. Human Rights Watch has said that the wording of the court's statute 'may make it more difficult to convict defendants who were not actually present at the scene,' making conviction of most commanders unlikely. The TNI remains powerful. The highest-ranking officer to be named as a suspect is regional commander MajGen Adam Damiri, though at this writing he has yet to be brought to trial. Ranking Indonesian officers are unlikely to face prosecution before the Serious Crimes Court in East Timor, because Indonesia continues to refuse to extradite suspects. Barring intense international pressure or the establishment of an international tribunal for East Timor, holding ranking Indonesian officers responsible will have to rely on the serendipity of legal actions in remote jurisdictions. The Panjaitan and Lumintang cases are part of a widening international effort to establish that certain crimes - especially war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide - are so heinous that their perpetrators can be pursued and prosecuted anywhere. The soon-to-be established International Criminal Court is the most prominent expression of this impulse to universal jurisdiction. But the ICC will not hear crimes retroactively, so it cannot deal with the abuses committed by Indonesia in East Timor. Well publicised was the 1998 effort by a Spanish magistrate to question Augusto Pinochet. The magistrate, pursuing a criminal investigation into the murder of Spanish citizens during the 1973 coup in Chile, sought to question the former Chilean dictator when he visited Britain. Pinochet was detained while the British courts decided whether to allow questioning. Ultimately, the British government declared him too old to stand trial and allowed him to return home. In the US, the effort has mainly involved private civil suits. Precedent was set by the case of Joel Filartiga, who had been tortured and murdered by a Paraguayan police official in 1976. His family tracked the official to the US and sued, but a lower court rejected the suit for lack of US jurisdiction. In 1981, a United States Court of Appeals ruled that the 'deliberate torture perpetrated under colour of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.' Michael Ratner of the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR) explains that the court found 'that it was appropriate for a court in the United States to hear the case, even though the occurrence and the parties had no substantial connection to the US. In part this was based on the concept of universal jurisdiction and that the right to be free from torture had been universally proclaimed by all nations. With stirring language, the court emphasised that a torturer could be brought to justice where found even for civil liability: "Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."' The law Filartiga was based on the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which allows non-citizens to sue for acts committed outside the United States 'in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' A later law, the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act, reaffirmed the 1789 law and gives US courts jurisdiction over claims by citizens involving torture or extrajudicial killing occurring anywhere. Filartiga has inspired numerous lawsuits against direct torturers, military commanders (like Lumintang and Panjaitan), and, recently, corporations involved with repressive regimes, including ExxonMobil in Aceh. These private actions are not at the mercy of the federal government�s foreign policy priorities and have resulted in billions of dollars of damages. However, cases can only go forward if the defendant is personally served legal papers while they are physically in the US Neither General Panjaitan nor Lumintang chose to return to defend themselves. The courts issued rulings of default in both cases, and then held hearings to determine the amount of compensatory damages for the plaintiffs' suffering and the amount of punitive damages. General Panjaitan was served papers in 1992 after he came to the US to enroll in Harvard Business School. A default judgment was entered against him in February 1993. Judge Patti Saris heard testimony in October 1994 from Allan Nairn, a journalist and eyewitness to the massacre, and from Constancio Pinto, an East Timorese resistance leader who helped organise the November 12 demonstration and who was then living in exile in the US. Todd testified that Bamadhaj, a New Zealand citizen, was shot in the arm during the initial attack, and later in the chest by an army patrol. Troops prevented a Red Cross jeep from taking him to a hospital and he bled to death. 'I'm the only plaintiff because I'm the only one of 271 families that can bring this case without endangering my other children,' she said. Although Indonesian military spokespersons claimed that Lumintang was not properly notified of the suit, he was personally served on 30 March 2000, as he was preparing to leave Washington after speaking before the US-Indonesia Society. Judge Gladys Kessler found him in default the following December after he failed to answer the suit. By the time Judge Kay presided over three days of testimony from several of the plaintiffs and expert witnesses in a Washington, DC, federal court, East Timorese were able to travel and testify, but most wished to remain anonymous, still fearing military or militia retaliation. Plaintiffs travelling to Washington included an East Timorese victim of Indonesian military and militia violence whose brother was killed and father injured in post-election attacks. The father testified via videotape. Two other East Timorese targeted by the Indonesian military in September 1999 during the scorched-earth campaign by Indonesia also testified: a mother whose son was killed, and a man shot by Indonesian soldiers who subsequently had to have his foot amputated. The court judgments, however, are not likely to enrich the surviving plaintiffs. Collection of any damages depends on uncovering the defendant's assets. So far, the US has been the only jurisdiction outside the archipelago to bring any Indonesian generals to court. One result has been that few, if any, prominent suspects of past rights violations are publicly travelling to the US anymore. Indonesian officials who especially value their ties to the US might view this as more than an inconvenience. People in other jurisdictions might want to examine their national laws and see what possibilities there are for similar legal actions. For the text of Judge Kay's 'Findings of fact and conclusions of law' and more information about the Lumintang and Panjaitan cases, see http://www.etan.org/news/2000a/11suit.htm. John M Miller (fbp@igc.org) is media and outreach coordinator of the East Timor Action Network (http://www.etan.org/). Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

The Indonesian who joined Falintil

Why did Nasir join the guerrillas? M Nasir, interviewed by Nug Katjasungkana Where are you from? I was born in Bali in 1975. My parents named me Ketut Narto. I was the youngest of three. My parents died when I was still small, and my two siblings disappeared until the present day. I became a street kid. Then I met a policeman who adopted me. He changed my name to Muhammad Nasir. But in the forest among the guerrillas my name is Klik Mesak, which means 'odd-ball' since I was the only Indonesian. When my father was sent to Baucau, Timor Lorosae, he took me with him. In Baucau I finished my primary school in 1990. I then moved to Dili where I studied as far as year two in senior high school. How did you become involved in the Timor Lorosae freedom struggle? When I moved to Timor Lorosae there were very few outsiders. I mixed with the local kids. I became attracted by the struggle. The Indonesian government said East Timor was the youngest province, the 27th. So then why was there always trouble here? I wanted to know. I read a history book. West Timor (Kupang) was colonised by the Dutch, East Timor by the Portuguese. Indonesia was the former Dutch colony. It can't just take East Timor. Perhaps if it was a federation. I feel Indonesia robbed others of their rights. I wouldn't want anyone to take away my rights. What's mine is mine, no one else can have it. Most of my friends supported independence. Some were active in the clandestine movement. In 1995 Maun Afonso, my adopted older brother and an independence supporter, took me to Fatubessi. All the villagers there up to the village head were independence supporters. The people were suspicious when they saw us. Who are these strangers coming here? This village often got visits from Rajawali [Kopassus] troops. When I asked the village head about it, he said, 'Just the way it is, this is an operations area'. After some time I met a Falintil member called Mau Kulit, who followed Comandante Dudu of North Sector, Region 4. After that the villagers stopped being suspicious of me. I became an estafeta [runner] for Falintil, whose job was to carry letters, food, look for information and so on. I lived in Fatubessi and became a primary school teacher. Some of my ex-students are now in junior high school. What made you decide to fight for Timor Lorosae's independence? In 1995 my step-father was transferred to Oecussi to become the deputy police commander there. I stayed behind in Dili with the West Dili police chief, a Javanese man from Trenggalek whom I called 'Uncle'. But I often mixed with the 'naughty boys' at the markets and the bus terminal. I made more and more friends. Some were in the clandestine. So were most of my Baucau friends. One day in Dili in 1995, a pro-independence demonstration happened near my school. All the school kids joined in, from five different senior high schools. A fight broke out with the new-comer kids from outside Timor Lorosae. I had a rock and threw it. It happened to hit a policeman who knew me. He looked at me and threatened: 'Look out, you be careful!' I was afraid and ran away. When I got home at night, my room was locked from the outside. I went in by the window and took my graduation certificate. Then I stayed with a friend in Kampung Alor. I became scared and confused when I heard the news on the radio about a disappearance, mentioning my name. I wasn't game to go home, and I also didn't want to cause trouble for the people who had adopted me. If I went back, my step-father would certainly be punished because his adopted kid was in a pro-independence demo. That's when I got to know Maun Afonso, who took me to live in his family's house in Fatubessi, the pro-independence village where the resistance made me an estafeta. From two Falintil members named Mario Kempes and Leo Timur I got military lessons like how to attack an enemy fortified position. I learned how to shoot guns like the Mauser, M-16, AR-16, G-3 and the SKS. I can use a machine gun. In 1997 Falintil decided to launch attacks against TNI posts everywhere the day before the election. The TNI were saying Falintil no longer existed. If there was no gunfire it would prove that indeed Falintil was finished. In Fatubessi, the job went to the youths (juventude). I was a juventude leader. We just had three grenades. Our targets were the TNI post, the house of the village chief, and a shop owned by the Catholic catechist. The village chief and the catechist were our own people. We attacked them with a grenade without pulling the pin. So they were safe. TNI didn't suspect them because they were among our targets. TNI shot off an enormous amount of ammunition. But none of us were hit. After that the soldiers arrested a lot of youths and tortured them. I wasn't arrested because they didn't suspect me. I was a primary school teacher. I became a member of Falintil in 1998. At that time leaders of the struggle like Region 4 Comandante Ular and Regional Secretary Riak Leman and others went from village to village. I was active in those meetings too. After that I spent most of my time at the Falintil command. When many of the villagers fled because of intimidation from the [pro-Indonesian] Besi Merah Putih militia, my friends and I sent food. When the militias began to act up in Liquia, I was often sent to Liquia town to meet with pro-independence youths. When the clash occurred between Besi Merah Putih and the youths in Liquia on 4 April 1999, I was in town. That night I joined a sub-regional meeting with the Region 4 Deputy Secretary Qouliati. The next day an attack occurred against the Liquia church. The youths were only armed with arrows and swords. But the militias had automatic weapons. Behind them were the TNI also with automatic weapons. I wasn't in the church so I was OK. I tried to contact the Falintil command to ask them to send troops to stop the militias and TNI at the church. But news came from the city that should Falintil become involved all those still in the church and those taken to the military base by the militias/ TNI would be killed. So Falintil didn't come down. After that I went back to Maun Afonso's house in Fatubessi. They thought I had died in the church. Maun Afonso suggested I not leave the village. 'If you're safe, we're safe. If anyone comes looking for you, I'll say "Nasir has gone home to Bali."' After that I stayed at Falintil command. Things improved once Unamet arrived. I was able to go out and buy food and clothes for the guerrillas. On the day of the referendum I was at the command post, while my guerrilla friends voted. Cruelty Did any other Indonesians become guerrillas or join the underground resistance against the Indonesian occupation? Jeffry, from Atambua in East Nusa Tenggara, now lives in Ermera. He used to be a Falintil member in Region 4 under Comandante Sabis. Ahmad, from Bima (Sumbawa), also lives in Ermera now. He was an estafeta since the 1980s. Lots of others quietly supported the movement by donating stuff to the clandestine. Ramlan, for example, from Sumatra. He is dead. Lots of them I don't know where they are. What do you think of Indonesian soldiers? I don't have vengeful feelings. What I don't like are the abuses they commit. Just imagine, we are the hosts here, and they come and step on us continually. I don't like that. The soldiers come to Timor Leste on instructions from their superiors to look for Falintil guerrillas. But the ones they arrest are just ordinary young people, uneducated and who don't speak Indonesian. Maybe they're carrying a small knife or a machete. Men in Timor Lorosae always carry a knife. They were sometimes tortured to death. Instead of going up into the forest, soldiers told to go and find Falintil would just go into the villages. They took peoples' cattle, chickens. Those who protested were called rebels. Indonesia said they wanted to root out evil communists. But those doing the rooting out were even worse. They even attacked a place of worship like the church in Liquia. Before I joined the independence movement I often saw Indonesian cruelty. When I was still living at the West Dili police station I saw the police arrest innocent people. During interrogation they would torture them so bad that they confessed. That's not good. It's true that Indonesia brought development even to remote areas. But many officials were corrupt. What was wrong they called right, what was right they called wrong. That's what made people dissatisfied. I didn't like it either. I think that if after the referendum Indonesia had given up Timor Lorosae properly, without giving weapons to the militias, the Timorese would have been very grateful to Indonesia. That one Indonesian act not only caused great loss to the people of Timor Lorosae but also to the people of Indonesia. The money was wasted on militias when the Indonesian people needed it very much. What are your hopes for the future of Timor Lorosae? For me the important thing is that people should be safe and there should be justice. If I'm allowed I want to live in Timor Lorosae. I have a wife and she is pregnant with our first child. Right now I feel my rights have not been fulfilled. Almost all my ex-Falintil friends who weren't accepted into the Timor Lorosae armed forces were given US$500 in assistance, but I didn't. I was sick for the test so didn't get in. I know we didn't fight to get this or that job, but for our independence and our rights. But it's strange all the same. For little people like myself, the important thing for the future is that the people have enough to eat and enjoy freedom. I hope President Xanana Gusmao will remember that. Recorded in Kampung Alor, Dili, 24 April 2002. Nug Katjasungkana (manu_mean@yahoo.com) is a human rights activist in Dili. Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

Meet Titi Irawati

An Indonesian human rights worker in East Timor Kerry Brogan Titi works at East Timor's best known human rights NGO, Yayasan HAK - one of few women and fewer Indonesians there. Her activism began when as a university student in 1978 she helped organise anti-Suharto demonstrations. From 1986 to 1995 she was a journalist with the women's magazine Sarinah. This led her to the growing number of human rights and women's non-government organisations (NGOs) in Indonesia. When in 1994 the government banned three Indonesian news magazines, Titi joined a committee of female journalists to fight for press freedom. She campaigned on behalf of journalists who were imprisoned, and later took up the cause of persecuted members of the leftist party PRD. While visiting PRD members in Cipinang prison she also met several imprisoned East Timorese, among them Xanana Gusmao. After talking with Xanana, she says, 'I became aware that democracy in Indonesia would not be realised if the occupation of East Timor continued'. Like many Indonesians, she had only learned about East Timor's human rights problems through the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre - after a foreign journalist showed her photographs. In 1996 the senior journalist Goenawan Mohamed asked her to join Isai, the Institute for the Study of the Free Flow of Information. She helped train East Timorese journalists studying in Indonesia. It was the highly publicised rape late in 1996 of a young woman in Ermera district by a TNI soldier that really drew Titi into the fight for human rights in Timor. She joined a campaign for an investigation. In March 1999, she travelled to East Timor for the first time, to conduct a training advocacy workshop with Yayasan HAK and other groups. A week later, dozens were killed at the nearby Liquica church. Back home Titi worked with others at the Jakarta solidarity organisation Fortilos to put pressure on the government. In June Fortilos sent her back to East Timor to become a volunteer with Yayasan HAK. Her job was to help distribute information about human rights violations. With the UN ballot fast approaching, Yayasan HAK was under enormous pressure. She edited the organisation's new magazine Direito. Terror As the post-ballot mayhem descended upon East Timor, most of East Timor's human rights workers were sheltering at the Yayasan HAK office in Farol, Dili. None of us can forget the tension. On 5-6 September 1999, the office was attacked by militias and the TNI. 'While we were being attacked,' Titi said, 'I realised more and more the terror the people of East Timor had experienced throughout the Indonesian occupation.' The only attempt by the authorities to provide protection was when the police mobile brigade Brimob arrived to escort the two white-skinned volunteers to safety, but not the East Timorese. The two refused to go without their colleagues. Brimob finally agreed to take them all out to police headquarters. From there they all flew out of the country, effectively removing the last human rights workers and witnesses to the gross human rights violations being perpetrated everywhere. 'We all cried when we left', Titi said. 'We witnessed the forced deportation of the civilian population, but could do nothing. I almost could not believe what I was seeing: the TNI and the militia it created, carrying out extraordinary acts of cruelty, while the international community was watching.' As she flew over Dili and witnessed the destruction, she promised herself she would return. She did return, in March 2000. She still works with Yayasan HAK, editing the monthly Direito, and the weekly political analysis Cidadaun. She continues her women's activism too, helping the women's organisation Fokupers edit their publication Babadok. When asked how East Timorese see her, she replies: 'Since I came to East Timor, I have become convinced that the people do not hate Indonesians. They hate the cruelty of the Indonesian military during the 24 years of occupation.' Titi's presence helps maintain links between East Timorese and Indonesian NGOs. She thinks strong links are vital to human rights campaigns in both countries. They can assist with the campaign for justice, not just for East Timor, but for Aceh, West Papua and other parts of Indonesia. East Timorese NGOs have complained about the restricted jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunal on East Timor in Jakarta. They are monitoring the process along with their Indonesian counter-parts. Like many, Titi does not believe the tribunal is a serious attempt at accountability, but a way for the Indonesian authorities to avoid an international tribunal to deal with the 1999 violence. But Timorese NGOs are not just struggling against Indonesian pragmatism. 'Some Timorese political leaders want to have "reconciliation without justice"', she says. 'They say the people "have to forget about the past". Timorese NGOs have to strengthen their solidarity with the victims, who still want to see justice, but who are rarely heard.' Kerry Brogan (brogan@un.org) works with the Untaet human rights office in Dili. Contact Titi at titi_irawati@yayasanhak.minihub.org. Yayasan HAK's web site is www.yayasanhak.minihub.org. Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

Australian treachery, again

This time, says an experienced activist, it's over oil and gas Robert Wesley-Smith 'Australian treachery against East Timor again' was the title of a public statement by Australians for a Free East Timor on 1 April 2002. I am writing this because during my lifetime Australia has been treacherous to or deserted East Timor six times. The first was my year of birth 1942. Australia withdrew its troops from East Timor in the face of overwhelming Japanese force, leaving not only the whole population to its fate but also guaranteeing death for most of the young men who had adopted Aussie commandos and been their eyes and ears and much more. During the Japanese occupation about 60,000 Timorese (12% of the population) died from attack and privation. Earlier this year Japan sent its forces back to East Timor, but they do not want to talk about their wartime occupation, much less say sorry or pay reparations. Several thousand surviving East Timorese are directly affected. Much work by Japanese and Australian activists has not made a huge impact on this issue yet. The family I grew up in was always well aware of aspects of WW2 history and the need to relate to Southeast Asia. My father had been a senior intelligence officer. He then had a lifetime of involvement with Asian students through the Colombo Plan at the University of Adelaide. He also studied in Indonesia. Ironically, us boys had a differing perspective on the Vietnam war. This introduced my brothers and I to human rights and the politics of Southeast Asia. We learned that the early years of the Indonesian Republic created a liberal democratic society, with Mohammed Hatta somewhat of a hero. We were thus always able to distinguish between the people and the military regime which ruled to its own advantage, from the repression in Aceh and Papua to the invasion of East Timor. I combined my busy job as a rural scientist in the Northern Territory with involvement in the growing struggle for the human rights and a decent standard of living for the indigenous people there. I mixed with young people from all over the Territory through playing and coaching sport. Gradually I managed more work opportunities with them, and I became involved in the land rights struggle with the pioneering Gurindji at Wattie Creek, now called Daguragu. In 1975 I was there when Prime Minister Whitlam poured sand into the black hands of my friend Vincent Lingiari in recognition of his people's land rights. Later I lived to regret the way the government 'recolonised' aboriginal affairs using its money and power, without the community having the strong counter-backing of their activist friends. I see history repeating itself in East Timor. Freedom After the Carnation Revolution in 1974, Portugal allowed political parties in its East Timor colony for the first time. Party activists such as Jose Ramos Horta visited Darwin to seek support, and I got drawn in. I believe in being involved in one's 'backyard' as a priority. However, Cyclone Tracy devastated our city at the end of that year, disrupting normal life. From Dili came an official offer to help in any way possible. I missed the great rallies in Timor in May 1975, but saw film of it and heard the call of freedom. Unfortunately stupid people, egged on by malicious ones in neighbouring countries, created a brief civil war which began and ended in August. We helped out with some aid via Acfoa and CAA. I engaged in a verbal battle with the mayor of Darwin to hold an appeal for East Timor - it didn't happen. Forward-thinking activists set up a radio link to East Timor in case the worst happened and normal communications were cut. But the die was cast, and Indonesia moved towards a full-scale invasion, with support from the Whitlam ALP government and then the Fraser Liberal government. I was amazed and appalled. Treachery number 2. Around Australia and in a few other places East Timor support groups were established. Then began three years of helping run Radio Maubere. We received the broadcasts from the mountains of East Timor sent by the Fretilin/ Falintil resistance. We also occasionally went to our countryside and did two-way broadcasts, whilst keeping a wary eye out for government telecommunications police, as we had been denied a licence. The information went to Sydney and Maputo/ Lisbon, and was published in East Timor News. But it was mostly met with indifference by the world press and governments. The details of this experience are in my chapter in Free East Timor (Vintage, 1998). We heard the horrifying accounts of a nation being systematically torn apart, raped and genocided. Why did the world let this happen? The broadcasts ceased in late 1978, and at that time the Fraser government gave de jure recognition to the brutal Indonesian military occupation of East Timor - Treachery 3. The 1980s were an isolated and difficult time for the support activists, as well as for the heroic resistance inside East Timor. Xanana quietly reformed the resistance and began to take it into the towns. So the foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas probably thought they were on a winner with the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 - Treachery 4. Their glee in fact galvanised some who saw the injustice. And as with most treaties and acts conceived and born in injustice, they will unravel. The Dili massacre at Santa Cruz, 12 November 1991, electrified the world when they saw it on film bravely taken by Max Stahl. Many groups formed or reformed. In Darwin we became Australians for a Free East Timor (Affet). Charlie Scheiner and others formed Etan and the email list for East Timor, which became the main information and linking mechanism. Initially from Jean Inglis in Japan the Ifet link with the UN was formed. Street action, as well as the paper war of lobbying and submissions, grew in Darwin and all over the world. But Australia signed a defence treaty with the Suharto regime, another one conceived and born in injustice. The Howard government continued to support the Suharto regime despite its military atrocities in East Timor - Treachery 5. Only after the devastation became so great that the world finally cried 'enough', was Interfet created in September 1999. The Keating defence treaty was torn up. Howard now pretends Australia has always been East Timor's best mate. Oil and gas Living on the southern shore of the Timor Sea, I have kept an interest in the massive oil and gas reserves, which were part of the reason for the travail heaped upon East Timor by greedy neighbours. We held a conference on these issues back in 1990. The Timor Gap Treaty was always illegal, but it was continued for a while after the 1999 independence ballot, as a starting point for a new agreement. Apart from a bit of coffee, the new nation has few ways of earning hard currency and thus lifting the health and living standards of its people other than from its oil and gas reserves. Unfortunately the inexperienced administration in East Timor, like the Gurindji before them, has been 'dudded' by the greedy and the powerful. Australia has played hardball once again, with a sneaky formulation of words as a new Timor Sea treaty. There was an effective public expose of this in March/ April 2002, and it was clear Australia was in breach of the international law of the sea. Australia then precipitately withdrew from the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, which guides the settlement of maritime boundaries issues. We concerned activists are continuing a hectic campaign to explain the issues. However the new East Timor government signed this document on 20 May. We can't understand why, it feels like the juggernaut is unstoppable. But Mari Alkatiri can stop it single-handedly, like Superman! This document undoubtedly will lead to the theft by Australia of most of their seabed resources, valued at over US$30 billion. So, Treachery 6 and continuing. We will keep working with civic society in East Timor and Australia to reverse this and to gain economic justice. Rob Wesley-Smith (rwesley@ozemail.com.au) is a spokesperson for Australians for a Free East Timor (Affet), Box 2155, Darwin NT 0801, Australia. Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

What about the workers?

Now is the time to create a fairer system Selma Hayati East Timor's economy has been transformed since the August 1999 referendum. First came the horrendous destruction of infrastructure by the Indonesian military, then the arrival of a large number of foreigners and associated business interests through Untaet. New urban employment opportunities have opened up in the service and construction sectors. Foreign investors, often from Singapore and Australia, import used cars and run construction businesses. Foreign supermarkets, restaurants, and hotels import their vegetables, beer, wine and mineral water from overseas. They compete with East Timorese and Indonesian small enterprises. A highly visible split has developed between the traditional market, filled by the local community, and the foreign-owned supermarkets patronised by the rich. Ignoring the predominant agrarian sector and even the now-defunct textile factory in Dili, the transitional government has focussed its policy efforts on the huge profits to be made from oil in the Timor Gap. Both UN Special Representative in East Timor Sergio Viera de Mello and former resistance leader Xanana Gusmao have also worked hard to ease the way to Timor Lorosa'e for foreign investors, saying they will stimulate economic growth and improve welfare. The strength of foreign capital, combined with the weakness of local business and of local law, have created structural problems these last two years. The transitional government is providing flexible legal protection for investors, while providing little protection for the rights of workers. The year 2000 saw a proliferation of sixteen political parties and 177 national non-government organisations (NGOs). Of these, only two parties said they were concerned with labour issues - Trabalhista and the Timor Socialists. Among the NGOs concerned with labour are Laifet, Yayasan HAK, and the Australian NGO Apheda. The Timor Socialist Party has its own workers union. Meanwhile the Timor Lorosa'e Workers Union Confederation (KSTL) brings together nine unions. Workers have campaigned on hours and overtime, on the contract work system, male and female wage discrimination, discrimination between the same type of local and foreign workers, and safety. There are also the matters of informal work, day labourers, part-time workers, and terminating employment. Labour Days have been an important focus for activists since 1 May 2000. Workers participation? However, the question remains how effective labour organisations have been. Whether they are political parties, NGOs, or unions, the participation of workers themselves tends to be weak. As in Indonesia in the mid-1990s, students have been the most vocal on labour issues. The two political parties who campaigned on labour issues in last year's election, meanwhile, tended to use workers merely as a vehicle so that elites could get into the Constituent Assembly. The August 2001 elections led to a transitional cabinet that would hold office for six months. One of its new features was the Secretary of State for Labour and Solidarity. This office continues the work of the Division of Social Services and Labor of the Untaet-led East Timor Transitional Administration. It is responsible for the settlement of labour disputes. Before the election, workers would bring their dispute before CNRT and NGOs. The Secretary will also provide much-needed data on national employment, wages, and disputes. Untaet declared at its beginning in November 1999 that all Indonesian law, thus including labour law, remains valid in Timor Lorosa'e. This has been less than satisfactory. Untaet and the national political elite opened the door wide for the entry of foreign capitalists and made Timor Lorosae a commodity for foreign investors to pay cheap wages and to violate workers rights without clear sanctions. Indonesian labour law also encouraged Timor Lorosae to lay the foundations of a developmentalism that was used by Indonesia for the last 35 years to exploit workers on a large scale. In October 2000 Untaet drafted a comprehensive set of employment standards, and in March 2001 four new draft labour regulations followed. There was little follow-up at the time. However, early in May Sergio Viera de Mello signed into law a new National Labour Code produced by the Secretary of State for Labour and Solidarity. It covers minimum labour conditions and administrative institutions, principles and procedures on unions and labour relations, and rules on terminating employment. NGOs, business associations, trade unions and Untaet have been involved in drafting labour regulations. But even NGOs and unions are caught in the technical issues of the regulations and have not started a debate on labour in relation to the system of national development. Even in Indonesia such technical issues have been left behind by the demand for reformation. The fundamental debates on labour politics in Indonesia could become important input for NGO activists and unionists. Indeed, NGOs and trade unions have supported the Untaet and political elite demand for a 44-hour working week, in contradiction to the ILO standard of 35-40 hours. The tendency has been for NGOs rather than trade unions to be involved with labour disputes. Untaet, meanwhile, tended to spread information about new labour regulations to NGOs and business associations, rather than to the unions. Selma Hayati (selmah@oxfam.org.tp) is researching labour in Dili. Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

A sustainable future

How will East Timor manage its economy? Helder da Costa Can tiny impoverished East Timor emerge as a viable, independent and stable state? This question mattered greatly as the Fretilin-dominated government took over the running of the nation, its institutions and economic policies on 20 May 2002. Like Bosnia and Herzegovenia, South Africa, Rwanda and Cambodia before it, East Timor is a nation emerging from trauma. It is only now experiencing its first years of peace and the beginnings of political, economic, and social recovery after the 24-year occupation and the mass destruction of September 1999. The initial period of reconstruction needs to place a priority on meeting basic needs (food, shelter, water, health, education), as well as on maintaining political stability and personal security, while encouraging reconciliation and economic recovery. If it is to meet the aspirations of its citizens, moreover, the reconstruction program must happen quickly and extend throughout the country. Institutional and policy foundations must be laid firmly and swiftly to prepare East Timor for sustainable recovery and growth. They must increasingly enable the country to rely on its own resources to design and implement the policies and institutions required for long-term development. An essential ingredient to provide that firm foundation is effective macroeconomic stability, so as to encourage foreign trade and investment and foster the private sector. As a small half-island economy, East Timor is characterised by a large traditional sector, producing primarily for subsistence. East Timor's development is constrained by bad roads and mountainous terrain, a shortage of skilled labour, and the proximity of the highly efficient economies of East Asia. Social development indicators lag behind those of other small Micronesian states. When East Timor became independent, it took its place as one of the twenty poorest countries in the world. Its GDP per capita is just US$478, and its human development rating places it in the same category as countries such as Angola, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Life expectancy in East Timor is just 57 years. Nearly half the population live on less than US$0.55 per day. Very few people have received an adequate education - more than half the population is illiterate (55%). Over 50% of infants are underweight. And the country is still suffering from the destruction and trauma that followed the national vote for independence on 30 August 1999. Bubble The capital Dili appears to be bustling. But most restaurants, hotels, vehicles and apartment rentals are part of a bubble economy fed by the huge foreign presence. The official currency, the US dollar, has displaced its major rivals, the Indonesian rupiah and Australian dollar. There was considerable profiteering at the changeover over the past year when many traders simply rewrote prices from Australian dollars to US dollars, effectively doubling them at a stroke. Aid and related spin-offs dominate much of the economy. This is an artificial economy that is not sustainable. It grew by 18 percent in 2001-02, but this was from a base of almost zero, and fuelled mainly by reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid. These factors were supplemented by the local coffee industry, where world prices are improving after several miserable years. Independence will initially have a devastating effect on the bubble economy that developed under the two-year UN administration. Peace-keeping forces will be reduced from more than 8,000 to about 5,000, while the number of highly paid UN officials will fall from 850 to less than 300. The departure of these well-paid foreigners will burst the bubble of affluence in the capital. Estimates in Dili are that about 1,700 local people will either become under-employed or entirely jobless when the UN administration winds down. It is indeed a tough year ahead. For 2002-03 it seems likely that growth will sink to zero. Thereafter a more balanced and sustainable form of development could set the country on a stable upward path. The majority of Timorese derive their welfare from agriculture, and this will be the case for many years to come. Overall, East Timorese policy makers will face agricultural challenges. These range from the immediate issues of the substantial population movements after the September 1999 crisis, with their connected land ownership disputes, to infrastructure rehabilitation, reactivating rural markets and the agricultural extension service, and re-establishing commercial ties across the border to Indonesian West Timor. Development of off-farm, seasonal income generating activities is also important. The new government's economic policies are pro-poor oriented but still untested. Its economic instincts are 'dirigiste' (meaning that the state must be involved in every aspect of social life). It will have to develop and maintain disciplined long-term fiscal policies in the face of the nation's grim poverty and its competing social and economic needs. Besides the promised oil and gas, and the already noted coffee, tourism is also an important potential income-earner. However, it is seriously constrained by the weak infrastructure, limited international air links and lack of skilled personnel. There will be a three-year gap in financing the government's budget between the end of current assistance programs and the beginning of significant revenue from the oil and gas in the Timor sea. So far, East Timor aid has been solely through grants. Although there is a willingness to offer more grants, these international donors may not be able to cover the full budget gap that is emerging. This will probably force the new country to accept loans, albeit at concessional rates. Once the oil and gas starts to bring in large income flows, some of the earlier problems of the 'artificial' economy will reemerge. Combined with continuing aid, this will give rise to a broader challenge. When even a part of this money is spent in the so-called 'non-traded' sector (such as food) it will cause inflation, which in turn will harm the exchange rate and thereby reduce the country's competitive ability. There will also be the danger of an urban elite appropriating the benefits of commercial opportunities and budgetary allocations. One of the major determinants of East Timor's long term economic future will be the way it uses revenues from the oil and gas in the Timor Sea. Under the 90-10 percent split wrestled out of Australia, this will provide a total income of US$7 billion over twenty years. However, even here there is a problem. The deal has hit a hitch with the decision by US-owned Phillips Petroleum and its partners to defer exploitation of the biggest field because of East Timor's decision to raise an extra US$1 billion in royalties. Guard the oil How should oil and gas revenue be managed? An endowment fund would save them in a trust fund that would store up some of the value for the next generation. This could act as a stabilising force. It would safeguard income from resource sales that rightly belong not only to East Timorese citizens of today but to those of the generation to come. There is clearly a balance to be struck here. Saving too high a proportion would mean foregoing some development opportunities and perhaps increasing the risk of the savings leaking away through corruption. Saving too little, on the other hand, might expose the country to financial problems in the future especially given the uncertainties in oil prices and the finite reserves under the seafloor. East Timor could consider a four-part fiscal strategy: Control public expenditure: Give priority to spending on health and education so as to expand people's capacities and stimulate human development. Avoid subsidising the wealthy: Fund at least some public services such as telecommunications partly from user fees. Build donor confidence: Maintain a stable social, economic and political environment and a respect for human rights. This is vital for human development. It also encourages donors who want concentrate their resources on the poorest countries, but only those that have a supportive environment where aid can be used well. Guard oil and gas revenues: Use them sparingly, and mostly for investment, since they are a one-off opportunity that will only last around twenty years. All this means that East Timor's economic growth will be incremental rather than rapid. The challenge for East Timor is to maintain sufficient fiscal discipline to ensure essential investment in human development and to stimulate private enterprise, while resisting the temptation to spend oil and gas revenues on current consumption. East Timor now has the opportunity to set out on a new path, pursuing labour-intensive, pro-poor growth. This will mean opening up opportunities for the poor, using micro-finance schemes that increase employment opportunities for women and other groups who are outside the formal labour force. East Timor should actively engage in trade with its neighbouring countries if it wishes to develop its economy rapidly. An independent East Timor will welcome sound investment by firms that wish to operate in an environment free of artificial barriers to trade. A secure investment climate will need appropriate laws protecting property rights and contracts, establishing a fair commercial code, codifying labour relations, and minimising the cost of doing business. A major and early priority of the infant government has to be to demonstrate to the East Timorese, to international donors and to potential investors the importance of sound economic management, and sound law and order and judicial arrangements. Dr Helder da Costa (helcosta@yahoo.com)is director of the National Research Centre, National University of East Timor (UNTL), Dili. Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

Timor's women

After the brutal occupation, gender violence remains a reality Dawn Delaney Photo 1. Caption: Women gather by the well in their Caritas supported communal garden, Oamna, Oecussi The most pressing concerns for East Timorese women since the 1999 referendum are gender related violence and entrenched poverty. Gender-related crimes make up 40% of all reported incidents around the country and domestic abuse crimes make up half of all cases being heard in Dili District Court. We have got the CivPol Vulnerable Persons Unit and organisations like Fokupers and ETWave providing support to victims of domestic violence. But as a long-term strategy we need other forms of support for women victims of domestic violence in terms of economic independence. We have already taken a big step forward in publicly discussing this issue. We need to strengthen the constitution even if it's only a reference to the position of the family and the responsibility to the wife. We tend to look at domestic violence in isolation. We write laws and make efforts to protect women, but it's part of a much wider social problem. (Dr Milena Pires, member of the Constituent Assembly and women's rights advocate) Photo 2. Caption: Manuela Perreira, Executive Director, Fokupers Fokupers started because women suffered from the policy of forced sterilisation during Indonesian times. We helped victims from the conflict, women prisoners and wives of prisoners. It has changed to include victims of domestic violence. Now, the main idea is to empower women. Before, the people just concentrated on getting independence. People think domestic violence is an individual problem. It's not, its a public problem but awareness among women about their rights is very low, their right to not have violence in the house, so we give awareness through radio. We have one safe house in Dili for victims who need intensive counselling. We have children who have had abuse. There are so many problems for women in East Timor.(Manuela Perreira, Executive Director, Fokupers) Photo 3. Caption: From left: Eva Quintao (22), Sofia Olivera Fernandes (19), Umbelina Soares, graduates from the Timor Leste Police Academy in Dili 'Sofia Olivera Fernandes: I'm originally from Maliana. I feel proud of myself. I would like to work on domestic violence in the CivPol Vulnerable Persons Unit. I am the first daughter to be a police officer. During Indonesian time the main problem is sexual violence against women but now we are correcting anyone suspected of this crime. We learn about negotiation and mediation. We do this with the family and advise them to take action with the help of the community. Our culture is very old and it teaches us in a nice way how to respect each other, how to behave and have a good attitude.' Photo 4. Caption: Martha Caub, Oecussi widow. 'My husband died for Timor. I have seven children to look after now. Food is our biggest problem. The widows have problems about money, clothes and food. We receive wood for a house but not built yet. I'm living in the kitchen hut until my house is built. I was pregnant when my husband was killed. The militia who killed my husband I say to him "please wake up my husband and rebuild my house." I want the militia to come back to rebuild my house and my life.' (Martha Caub, Oecussi widow) Dawn Delaney (dydel@netconnect.com.au) is a freelance photojournalist based in country Victoria, Australia. This material is part of her photo documentary project 'Lives remembered: Stories of East Timorese women' (Dawn Delaney, 2002) Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

Born in the wrong era

Amidst globalisation, can East Timor still be a people's alternative? Mansour Fakih My first visit to East Timor was early in 2000. The towns were still smoldering, and the atmosphere was tense. I was shocked, angry, and so disillusioned. I never suspected my own people could have done such a thing. Outside the church in Suai the candles were still burning. There were flowers, and people said: this is where the priests were massacred. At night, I watched videos people had recorded of the abuses as they took place. A large number of them, many by amateurs, and they showed that the military was involved. Here we were, Indonesians training human rights observers and educators who would be placed in every district of East Timor - a great experiment in democracy. My country had been one of the biggest human rights abusers of the twentieth century. All the examples in our training were taken from Indonesia. When I went back to Indonesia there was nothing in the news about what Indonesian soldiers had done in East Timor. People were regretful, not for the abuses committed by their army, but because the East Timorese had chosen to leave Indonesia. This completely missed the point. So far, no lessons have been learned about what happened in East Timor. The next time I went there was in early 2001. There had been a big change. Not the frustration of a year before, but an enthusiasm among the non-government organisations (NGOs) to help write the new constitution. I have been an activist for many years in Indonesia but I had never seen this before, and was most impressed. I was asked to help some women who wanted to introduce women's rights into the constitution. The political parties didn't have this on their agenda, and none of us really knew what to do. They were not professional lawyers or even human rights advocates. But they were so committed. We workshopped about domestic violence. Then they discovered the UN Women's Convention. They studied it and took eleven clauses to put into their constitution. They then went back to their home districts and lobbied everyone they could find. They asked us to make their posters and campaign T-shirts in Yogyakarta. In the end four or five clauses got into the constitution! They were delighted, because it had been by their own effort. Now they want to watch if this constitution will improve their lives. That is East Timorese democracy. People in Indonesia often think democracy is just about avoiding riots during elections. But it's about human rights literacy, and about women's involvement in drafting the constitution, to name just what I have seen. World Bank model On my third visit last April I met with NGOs who were thinking about advocacy after independence. What's your advocacy agenda? I asked them. They didn't really know. We discussed whether East Timor should join the World Bank. There is a debate about that. Some think we should be realistic, and it's OK to have debt, while others disagree. The NGOs do not yet have an agreed position. Some feared East Timor could become like Indonesia - mired in debt. Others agreed that East Timor could be forced to adopt the 'World Bank model', but felt it couldn't afford not to enter into debt because 'we have no money'. But all were worried that a free-market economy could be in conflict with the ideals that lay behind the independence struggle. Women want the state to protect women's rights, everyone wants the state to protect their economic rights, but in the 'World Bank model', the state is powerless to protect. It is not permitted to subsidise. So we asked ourselves: What would happen to the people if the state were to become so indebted it lost its power to protect? In fact the NGOs were in a difficult position, because many of them were helping the World Bank carry out 'community empowerment programs' in the villages. People welcomed the World Bank money. The Bank was just like the Church, they said - it cares for people. But in fact this is just another form of Structural Adjustment Program. This is the World Bank's way of preparing people for the free market, for privatisation of state facilities and an end to subsidies. The World Bank is aggressively lobbying the government to take on debt. They see East Timor as a clean slate, a model of what can be achieved with free market methods. It is true that East Timor has been destroyed and badly needs money. East Timor needs to be rescued. But there are sources other than debt. For the European Union, for example, a few tens of millions of dollars is peanuts. Indonesia has a moral responsibility towards East Timor. Without talking the legal language of war reparations, Indonesia needs to acknowledge it must pay East Timor back for all the infrastructure it destroyed in September 1999 - from telephones to electricity supplies. Other neighbours also need to be generous. East Timor needs cash, not debt. Once there was the Marshall Plan, and the Colombo Plan. These were government-to-government grants. The World Bank was actually born in this era of state-led development - it was the Keynesian reaction against the free market. But today all that is regarded as in conflict with the principles of good governance. There must be no subsidies - everything is to be financed by debt. East Timor has already or will soon ratify four international conventions - on women, on children, on civil and political rights, and on economic and socio-cultural rights. East Timor is more advanced than Indonesia in all these areas. All these conventions place the state in the role of protector to the people. But if East Timor enters the World Bank, and after that the World Trade Organisation (WTO), its obligations will soon be in conflict with its responsibilities under these conventions. East Timor was born at the wrong moment. It was conceived from ideals of social justice, human rights. It was to be a state that would protect the people's rights. Its constitution is very socialistic. It took over in its entirety clause 33 from the Indonesian constitution, which specifies that all natural resources are managed by the state on behalf of the people. But this is the era of free markets, of liberalism, of corporate globalisation - what a contrast with the spirit of the East Timorese struggle! We outsiders always supported East Timor in that spirit. We are mistaken if we think the struggle is now over. We need a new global solidarity movement to rescue the baby! Otherwise the people will soon be disappointed as the real economic policy becomes clear to them. They will feel betrayed and lose their trust in Xanana and his government. At least during the Indonesian colonial period there were public health clinics - this was after all a period of state-led development. But now there has to be competition and user-pays. People could become nostalgic for the past! The new state of East Timor is under attack. The NGO community needs to support it. Let us not wait until it is too late. The message to the World Bank should be - leave East Timor alone! But the global solidarity movement should not leave East Timor alone. East Timor can become an alternative, just like we hoped Nicaragua would become an alternative in the 1980s. Mansour Fakih (mansourf@remdec.co.id) directs the NGO Insist, in Yogyakarta. Inside Indonesia 71: Jul - Sep 2002

Planning Jakarta

Review: Abidin Kusno examines trends in architectural design and urban planning in Jakarta Julie Shackford-Bradley In this book, Abidin Kusno examines trends in architectural design and urban planning in Jakarta over the 20th century that resulted in the 1998 riots. Kusno's objectives are to show how 'imagined community' takes concrete form and substance in the 'real' spaces of the city' in order to understand the ways in which postcolonial cities alter the space and form of the built environment for themselves, in the process, forming a dialog with their colonial past. As a representation of that dialog, Jakarta exposes its blind spots. Kusno argues that Jakarta's architects and urban planners have struggled with legacies of the colonial mind-set, particularly the 'tradition vs. modernity' construct used deceptively by both the Sukarno and New Order governments in their quest for power. The results have been disastrous for Jakarta's underclass. Kusno contends that, while Sukarno promoted Jakarta's post-independence design in terms of 'modernist' nationalism, the downtown area was discreetly modelled on elements of aristocratic Javanese power and grandeur. Display models of the city's master plan simply ignored the kampung (lower class areas), as did Sukarno's urban policies. Suharto's equation of nationalism and the 'traditional' was just as inconsistent. The New Order saw the emergence of an upper class with transnational dreams of 'First World' style housing developments and culture. Motivated by a fear of falling in status, this upper class elevated itself, literally, through the creation of fly-overs (elevated highways) that build up confidence leaving behind the 'lower' classes who are routed through the crowded street at ground level. Through transmigration, the becak (pedicab) removal program, and Petrus, (mysterious shootings), the urban street was further transformed into a site of disturbance and criminality. Now nationalism was linked with development and the mass media announced the birth of a new ideal middle class subject of the nation. Meanwhile, the underclass was degraded into a mass of 'undesirables'; excluded from the new nationalism, they had no overarching affiliation and nothing to lose in 1998. These issues are familiar, but benefit from Kusno's analysis of their spatial aspects. The book also presents a discussion of tropical architecture, from both the colonial period (featuring the buildings of Thomas Karsten and Henri Post) and the present (Sumet Jumsei's 'water-based' cultures, and Ken Yeang's bioclimactic skyscrapers) that blend local/traditional and modernist elements. Through such examples, Kusno projects a hopeful vision for the future in which more Indonesian architects and urban designers can practice this type of fusion, once freed from the colonial mindset that still constrains them. Abidin Kusno, Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and Political Cultures in Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge, 2000 Julie Shackford-Bradley (julie_shackford-bradley@csumb.edu) Inside Indonesia 72: Oct - Dec 2002

Two Visionaries Of Indonesian Theatre

Two directors resided in an intercultural realm Ian Brown Teguh Karya and Suyatna Anirun were each inspired by traditional and popular forms of theatre throughout Indonesia, as well as the Western forms of theatre they adapted for the stage. Their style of theatre resided in the realm of intercultural practices that all theatre artists in Indonesia now revere. Perhaps better known in the Western world for his international standing in the realm of film, Teguh's career in the theatre spanned a period of twenty-five years from 1968 to 1993. Teguh, of Chinese ancestry, was born in Pandeglang, West Java, on 22 September 1937. His former name was Steve Lim, but assumed his current name when Suharto's New Order regime repressed the social presence and activities of the Chinese communities in the early days of his presidency. Undeterred by repression, Teguh's Teater Populer was inaugurated on 14 October 1968 in the Bali Room of Jakarta's first modern international star-rated hotel, the Hotel Indonesia. Two short plays were performed to mark the occasion; they were adaptations of Western works, Antara Dua Perempuan (Between Two Women) by Alice Gerstenberg and Kammerherre Alving, Teguh's version of Hendrik Ibsen's Ghosts. Two key elements of Teguh's theatre and films were naturalism and realism. These western influences derived from his studies at the Akademi Teater Nasional Indonesia (National Theatre Academy of Indonesia) in Jakarta, where he entered in 1961. Teater Populer's core repertoire was adaptations of Western plays. Notable among them were The Marriage and The Inspector General by Nicolai Gogol, Tartuffe by Moliere, The Father by August Strindberg, The Glass Menagerie by Tennessee Williams, Bertolt Brecht's The Good Woman of Szechwan and Garcia Lorca's Blood Wedding. Teater Populer only performed two plays originally set in Indonesia, namely, Dag Dig Dug by Putu Wijaya and Jayaprana, a play based on the story of a legendary Balinese hero warrior, by the Dutch writer Jef Last. Teguh continued to apply intercultural forms of stage presentation by adapting Sophocles' Antigone into the social and cultural environment of the Batak people of North Sumatra. The performance tradition of the Balinese dance dramas such as Barong, Gambuh and Arja influenced the style Teguh adopted for Jayaprana. This is the last recorded stage work performed by Teater Populer before it disbanded. Teguh Karya then dedicated himself fully to film and television sinetron. He had previously engaged with the medium of television for high quality play performances by Teater Populer since 1969. Suyatna Anirun is rarely mentioned abroad, but in Indonesia itself his reputation as a great director and actor has impacted on the development of modern theatre throughout the archipelago. Born on 20 July 1936 in Bandung, West Java, in 1958 Suyatna, together with other artist colleagues, established Studiklub Teater Bandung (Study Club Theatre of Bandung), which became known simply as STB. Its first performance in March 1958 was Jayaprana. Suyatna had been educated not in a theatre arts institution, but through the Faculty of Fine Arts and Design at the renowned Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology), ITB, where the former first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, had studied. Suyatna directed plays in both the tradition of Western realism and through acculturation of performance traditions from the Sundanese region of West Java. Like Teater Populer, STB main repertoire was adaptations and translations of Western plays. Among the more notable Western playwrights were W. B. Yeats, Anton Chekhov, G. B. Shaw, Tennessee Williams, Pinero, Gogol, Ben Jonson, Shakespeare, Moliere, Brecht, Eugene Ionesco, Albert Camus, Jean Girradoux and Max Frisch. STB also performed works by a number of Indonesian playwrights, such as Kirjomulyo, Utuy Tatang Sontani, Misbach Yusa Biran, Ajip Rosidi, Motinggo Busye and Saini K.M.. Their plays share a prime place of literary importance in the development of modern Indonesian theatre. The performance genres of longser and masres from West Java were a fitting style for adaptations of plays such as Ben Jonson's political satire Volpone or The Fox for which Suyatna chose to use traditional masks in his version titled Karto Loewek. Costuming for this performance was the customary dress of the Sundanese, both formal attire and everyday street clothes were worn. A similar treatment was applied to the performance of The Matchmaker by Gogol adapted by Suyatna as Mak Comblang, but mixed with modern day dress. Performance aesthetics were always paramount in Suyatna's theatre. He maintained that the theatre was primarily a source of entertainment despite the presence of its didactic. In many respects the essence of his theatre was Brechtian, a fact many Indonesian (and Western) critics and writers recognised when analysing the performance style of STB. Although well acquainted with the theatre of Bertolt Brecht, curiously Suyatna waited for twenty years before he directed Brecht's Caucasian Chalk Circle, which was performed in 1978 with the title Lingkaran Kapur Putih. Its success ensured performances in Jakarta at the arts centre, TIM, the nation's international showcase for the prime products of Indonesian art. Perhaps the highest peak Suyatna reached was his production of Shakespeare's King Lear (Raja Lear) for STB. First performed in Bandung in April 1986, it was heralded by critics and the public alike for the virtuosity of Suyatna's performance in the role of King Lear. Prior to King Lear, Suyatna had directed Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet (Romeo dan Yulia) in November 1993 followed by A Midsummer-Night's Dream (Impian Di Tengah Musim) in August and September I991. The theatre performed by STB and directed by Suyatna was distinguished by its diversity of repertoire, its constant exploration of new forms through acculturation of performance traditions and its constant high standards of performance. STB itself also has the reputation of being the longest active group in the history of modern Indonesian theatre. The theatre world of Indonesia has paid its last respects to these two visionary artists. Teguh died in Jakarta on 12 December 2001, Suyatna died in Bandung on 4 January 2002. Ian Brown [darian@indosat.net.id] completed his PhD at NTU and is now an independent writer and theatre researcher in Bandung. Inside Indonesia 72: Oct - Dec 2002

One less place to hide

The Indonesian who joined Falintil

Meet Titi Irawati

Australian treachery, again

What about the workers?

A sustainable future

Timor's women

Born in the wrong era

Planning Jakarta

Two Visionaries Of Indonesian Theatre

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