Wahid's presidency may herald the end of Indonesia as we know it.
Michael van Langenberg
The Jakarta Post on November 10 editorialised as follows:
The
central government must do away with its obsession with national unity
and start giving real autonomy to the regions. The government must not
offer half-hearted measures if it wants to spare this nation from
disintegrating. Barring complete separation, the ultimate form of
autonomy is federalism.... Ultimately, the real threat to
disintegration.... comes from Jakarta.
The
New Order regime from its inception in 1966 constructed a state-system
in which two factors predominated. First was an idealised nation
conceived in the official motto of 'Unity in Diversity' (Bhinneka
Tunggal Ika). Second were notions of an 'integralistic' state resting
on 'family' principles, designed to protect an archipelaegic unity
(wawasan nusantara). From its very beginning in 1945 there has been a
crucial contradiction in the Indonesian state-system between ideal
legal principles of regional autonomy, and the reality of an
increasingly centralised national state.
The
collapse of the Suharto presidency in 1998 may mark the end of a
century-long process of bureaucratic centralism in state building. That
process began with the consolidation of the imperial state of the
Netherlands Indies at the turn of the 20th century. In its later stage,
Suharto's presidency came to resemble the imperial
governor-generalships, supplemented with resonances of pre-colonial
divine kingship. Suharto's presidency ended amid a massive loss of
popular legitimacy. National government itself was perceived widely as
corrupt and nepotistic, responsible for abuses by the military,
greedily appropriating regional resources, and culturally arrogant.
In
the past decade, coherent independence movements emerged in several
territories of the state. East Timor is now on the road to full
independence. Aceh seems destined to achieve either independence or
some kind of special 'federalist' relationship with Jakarta in the
immediate future. Irian Jaya has just been divided into three
provinces, creating increased local resentment against what is
perceived as a further example of Jakartan imperialism. Increasingly
coherent movements for regional 'autonomy' are now also active in the
Moluccas (in two areas), Sulawesi (more than one!), Riau, West and East
Kalimantan, West Sumatra, and Bali.
Dispersal
How
will the new government headed by President Abdurrahman Wahid deal with
these movements? Executive government is vastly weaker than a decade
earlier. The legislature is now more powerful and more legitimate than
at any time since the mid-1950s. It has successfully restricted
presidential incumbency to two five-year terms, and made the president
answerable to parliament once a year. The chairman of the Peoples'
Consultative Assembly (MPR), Amien Rais, is a prominent advocate of a
federalist state. Popular legitimacy of the internal security functions
and political role of the military is now lower than at any time in the
history of independent Indonesia. The ruling oligarchy of the New Order
no longer dominates the economy to the extent it did prior to the
economic crisis of 1997-98. Conditions are ripe for a significant
dispersal of power within the Jakartan empire.
Supporters
of Wahid and vice-president Megawati Sukarnoputri present their
political partnership as an integrating leadership 'duality'
(dwitunggal), echoing that of Indonesia's two independence
'proklamator's Sukarno and Hatta. Like them, Wahid and Megawati reflect
a partnership of Islamic identity and secularist orientation. Similar
echoes of the earlier dwitunggal are heard in Wahid's stated preference
for a federalist Indonesia, while Megawati has emphasised commitment to
her father's vision of a centralised unitary state. However, unlike the
symbolic regional duality of Java/Bali and Sumatra/'outer islands' of
the Sukarno-Hatta dwitunggal, Wahid and Megawati constitute an
emphatically Javanese variant of national political culture.
The
new cabinet has been designated the Cabinet of National Unity. In
reality it is a cabinet of compromise and coalition building. It brings
together conflicting political forces - rural Javanese Islam,
modernising reformist Islam, secularist nationalism, federalists,
unitarists, military professionals, internationalists, protectionists,
liberal democrats. It reflects the broad coalition that Wahid built
within the MPR in October to gain the presidency. In a sense this was
less a coalition to ensure that Wahid became president than to ensure
that Megawati did not. Once the Wahid-Megawati dwitunggal was in place,
the cabinet had to accommodate the wide range of interests behind it.
These negotiations saw the cabinet increase from Wahid's initially
intended 25 to an eventual 35 portfolios. Policy coherence might prove
impossible. Executive government instability is a distinct likelihood.
Alongside
'reformasi', 'referendum' has entered the dominant national discourse.
The former emphasises a new era of 'moral' politics, with national
leaders seeking popular legitimacy as a matter of priority. The latter
discourse, on display most vocally in East Timor and Aceh, has placed
the debate about federalism and secessionism at centre stage. The
'Jakartan empire' is facing far-reaching structural change.
Michael van Langenberg (mvl@asia.usyd.edu.au)
is a private consultant and researcher on contemporary Indonesia and
Southeast Asia, and fractional employee in the School of Asian Studies,
University of Sydney.
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