How will East Timor manage its economy?
Helder da Costa
Can tiny impoverished East Timor emerge as a viable, independent and stable state? This question mattered greatly as the Fretilin-dominated government took over the running of the nation, its institutions and economic policies on 20 May 2002.
Like Bosnia and Herzegovenia, South Africa,
Rwanda and Cambodia before it, East Timor is a nation emerging from
trauma. It is only now experiencing its first years of peace and the
beginnings of political, economic, and social recovery after the
24-year occupation and the mass destruction of September 1999. The
initial period of reconstruction needs to place a priority on meeting
basic needs (food, shelter, water, health, education), as well as on
maintaining political stability and personal security, while
encouraging reconciliation and economic recovery.
If it is to meet the aspirations of its citizens,
moreover, the reconstruction program must happen quickly and extend
throughout the country. Institutional and policy foundations must be
laid firmly and swiftly to prepare East Timor for sustainable recovery
and growth. They must increasingly enable the country to rely on its
own resources to design and implement the policies and institutions
required for long-term development. An essential ingredient to provide
that firm foundation is effective macroeconomic stability, so as to
encourage foreign trade and investment and foster the private sector.
As a small half-island economy, East Timor is
characterised by a large traditional sector, producing primarily for
subsistence. East Timor�s development is constrained by bad roads and
mountainous terrain, a shortage of skilled labour, and the proximity of
the highly efficient economies of East Asia.
Social development indicators lag behind those of
other small Micronesian states. When East Timor became independent, it
took its place as one of the twenty poorest countries in the world. Its
GDP per capita is just US$478, and its human development rating places
it in the same category as countries such as Angola, Rwanda,
Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Life expectancy in East Timor
is just 57 years. Nearly half the population live on less than US$0.55
per day. Very few people have received an adequate education - more
than half the population is illiterate (55%). Over 50% of infants are
underweight. And the country is still suffering from the destruction
and trauma that followed the national vote for independence on 30
August 1999.
Bubble
The capital Dili appears to be bustling. But
most restaurants, hotels, vehicles and apartment rentals are part of a
bubble economy fed by the huge foreign presence. The official currency,
the US dollar, has displaced its major rivals, the Indonesian rupiah
and Australian dollar. There was considerable profiteering at the
changeover over the past year when many traders simply rewrote prices
from Australian dollars to US dollars, effectively doubling them at a
stroke.
Aid and related spin-offs dominate much of the economy. This is an artificial economy that is not sustainable. It
grew by 18 percent in 2001-02, but this was from a base of almost zero,
and fuelled mainly by reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid.
These factors were supplemented by the local coffee industry, where
world prices are improving after several miserable years.
Independence will initially have a
devastating effect on the bubble economy that developed under the
two-year UN administration. Peace-keeping forces will be reduced from
more than 8,000 to about 5,000, while the number of highly paid UN
officials will fall from 850 to less than 300. The departure of these
well-paid foreigners will burst the bubble of affluence in the capital.
Estimates in Dili are that about 1,700 local people will either become
under-employed or entirely jobless when the UN administration winds
down.
It is indeed a tough year ahead. For
2002-03 it seems likely that growth will sink to zero. Thereafter a
more balanced and sustainable form of development could set the country
on a stable upward path.
The majority of Timorese derive their welfare from agriculture, and this will be the case for many years to come. Overall, East Timorese policy
makers will face agricultural challenges. These range from the
immediate issues of the substantial population movements after the
September 1999 crisis, with their connected land ownership disputes, to
infrastructure rehabilitation, reactivating rural markets and the
agricultural extension service, and re-establishing commercial ties
across the border to Indonesian West Timor. Development of off-farm,
seasonal income generating activities is also important.
The new government�s economic policies are
pro-poor oriented but still untested. Its economic instincts are
'dirigiste' (meaning that the state must be involved in every aspect of
social life). It will have to develop and maintain disciplined
long-term fiscal policies in the face of the nation�s grim poverty and
its competing social and economic needs.
Besides the promised oil and gas, and the
already noted coffee, tourism is also an important potential
income-earner. However, it is seriously constrained by the weak
infrastructure, limited international air links and lack of skilled
personnel.
There will be a three-year gap in financing
the government�s budget between the end of current assistance programs
and the beginning of significant revenue from the oil and gas in the
Timor sea. So far, East Timor aid has been solely through grants.
Although there is a willingness to offer more grants, these
international donors may not be able to cover the full budget gap that
is emerging. This will probably force the new country to accept loans,
albeit at concessional rates.
Once the oil and gas starts to bring in large
income flows, some of the earlier problems of the 'artificial' economy
will reemerge. Combined with continuing aid, this will give rise to a
broader challenge. When even a part of this money is spent in the
so-called 'non-traded' sector (such as food) it will cause inflation,
which in turn will harm the exchange rate and thereby reduce the
country's competitive ability. There will also be the danger of an
urban elite appropriating the benefits of commercial opportunities and
budgetary allocations.
One of the major determinants of East Timor�s long term economic future will be the way it uses revenues from the oil and gas in
the Timor Sea. Under the 90-10 percent split wrestled out of Australia,
this will provide a total income of US$7 billion over twenty years.
However, even here there is a problem. The deal has hit a hitch with
the decision by US-owned Phillips Petroleum and its partners to defer
exploitation of the biggest field because of East Timor's decision to
raise an extra US$1 billion in royalties.
Guard the oil
How should oil and gas revenue be managed? An
endowment fund would save them in a trust fund that would store up some
of the value for the next generation. This could act as a stabilising
force. It would safeguard income from resource sales that rightly
belong not only to East Timorese citizens of today but to those of the
generation to come. There is clearly a balance to be struck here.
Saving too high a proportion would mean foregoing some development
opportunities and perhaps increasing the risk of the savings leaking
away through corruption. Saving too little, on the other hand, might
expose the country to financial problems in the future � especially
given the uncertainties in oil prices and the finite reserves under the
seafloor. East Timor could consider a four-part fiscal strategy:
Control public expenditure � Give priority to spending on health and education so as to expand people�s capacities and stimulate human development.
Avoid subsidising the wealthy � Fund at least some public services such as telecommunications partly from user fees.
Build donor confidence � Maintain a stable
social, economic and political environment and a respect for human
rights. This is vital for human development. It also encourages donors
who want concentrate their resources on the poorest countries, but only
those that have a supportive environment where aid can be used well.
Guard oil and gas revenues � Use them sparingly, and mostly for investment, since they are a one-off opportunity that will only last around twenty years.
All this means that East Timor�s economic growth
will be incremental rather than rapid. The challenge for East Timor is
to maintain sufficient fiscal discipline to ensure essential investment
in human development and to stimulate private enterprise, while
resisting the temptation to spend oil and gas revenues on current
consumption. East Timor now has the opportunity to set out on a new
path, pursuing labour-intensive, pro-poor growth. This will mean
opening up opportunities for the poor, using micro-finance schemes that
increase employment opportunities for women and other groups who are
outside the formal labour force.
East Timor should actively engage in trade with
its neighbouring countries if it wishes to develop its economy rapidly.
An independent East Timor will welcome sound investment by firms that
wish to operate in an environment free of artificial barriers to trade.
A secure investment climate will need appropriate laws protecting
property rights and contracts, establishing a fair commercial code,
codifying labour relations, and minimising the cost of doing business.
A major and early priority of the infant
government has to be to demonstrate to the East Timorese, to
international donors and to potential investors the importance of sound
economic management, and sound law and order and judicial arrangements.
Dr Helder da Costa (helcosta@yahoo.com) is director of the National Research Centre, National University of East Timor (UNTL), Dili.
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