Sending Troops is not Going to Solve Regional Conflicts
Douglas Kammen
Indonesia is presently faced with large-scale
conflicts in the regions of Aceh, West Papua, Ambon, and Central
Sulawesi. The basic remedy of successive governments in the
post-Suharto period has been to send more troops to these regions.
There has been a steady and dramatic rise in the number of troops
deployed since 1998. These additional troops have not ended the
conflicts. In fact, they have set in motion a dangerous dynamic in
which the military finds itself incapable of doing anything but sending
more and more troops.
The Indonesian army is organised on the basis of a
territorial structure. Paralleling the civilian bureaucracy, this
structure extends from the twelve regional military commands down to
the village-level babinsa. It serves as the army�s instrument for
policing society. Troops within the structure are intended to be
strongly rooted to their area and are thus referred to as �organic�
troops. If a violent conflict within a region becomes too large for
them to handle, the military high command in Jakarta dispatches what
are called �non-organic� troops from other territorial commands or
combat troops from the army�s Strategic Reserves (Kostrad) and Special
Forces (Kopassus)
In responding to the armed movements for
independence in Aceh and West Papua and the Christian-Muslim violence
in Ambon, Central Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi, the military has
relied on the deployment of �non-organic� and Kostrad troops. Indeed,
the military seems to have no other strategy.
Deployments
Since the fall of President Suharto in 1998 the
military has sharply increased the number of troops deployed from all
service branches (the army, air force, navy, and police). I will
consider only army deployments in this essay since they constitute the
vast bulk of the troops.
In 1998, in addition to the territorial units
already in conflict zones, the army deployed at least 28 additional
battalions to East Timor, Aceh and Papua. Non-organic troops were
predominant in East Timor and Aceh while Kostrad troops were
predominant in Papua.
In 1999, deployment increased to at least 29
battalions. While the number of troops in East Timor remained roughly
the same as the previous year, it dropped in both Aceh and Papua and
increased in Ambon in response to the outbreak of communal violence
there.
In 2000, troop deployment further increased to at
least 40 battalions. That increase took place despite the commitment of
President Wahid, who took office in October 1999, to find negotiated
solutions to separatism and ethnic-religious conflict. Those 40
battalions represented nearly one third of total Army troop strength.
Remarkably, the Moluccan islands received the greatest number (15
non-organic and 4 Kostrad battalions), followed by Aceh (7 non-organic
battalions), Papua (7 Kostrad battalions), West Timor (2 non-organic
and 4 Kostrad battalions), and Poso (3 non-organic battalions).
The following year, 2001, at least 57 battalions
were deployed to handle regional violence. This included a sharp
increase in Aceh (8 non-organic and 6 Kostrad battalions), a modest
increase in West Timor (5 non-organic and 3 Kostrad battalions), a
significant decrease in Papua (2 non-organic and 3 Kostrad battalions),
a larger increase in Ambon (21 non-organic battalions but only 1
Kostrad battalion), as well as stable numbers in Poso (3 non-organic
battalions) and new deployments to Central Kalimantan (3 non-organic
and 2 Kostrad battalions).
With improvements in Poso, Central Kalimantan, and
Papua, the total number of battalions deployed in 2002 has dropped to
44. This includes 14 non-organic and 3 Kostrad battalions in Ambon and
13 non-organic and 8 Kostrad battalions in Aceh, and lower levels in
West Timor and Papua.
In viewing the army�s deployments, it is clear
that the military�s strategy to handle regional conflicts has been to
throw more and more troops at them. In the four years from 1998 to
2001, the number of non-territorial battalions sent to conflict areas
jumped from 28 to 57. Counting territorial troops as well as
non-organic and Kostrad battalions, more than half of the Army�s
battalions are now bogged down in Aceh, Papua, Ambon, and along the
border with East Timor. Still other units are on alert for the return
of the Islamic organisation Laskar Jihad from Ambon to East Java and
the safeguarding of Bali in the wake of the 12 October bombing. Other
battalions have been confined to barracks because of disciplinary
infractions. Escalation is reaching its limits.
A vicious cycle
The experience of the past four years suggests
that the military now finds itself caught in a vicious cycle of
escalation and deescalation. The logic works something like this. When
regional violence increases, the military responds by sending more
external troops to the region. But given the competing chains of
command, the poor training of troops, the military�s own deeply
entrenched business interests, and the ambiguous mission assigned to
the troops (�restore order�), escalation invariably leads to
atrocities. When atrocities occur, civilian and military elites
frequently respond by reducing the number of external troops. But this
reduction creates a situation conducive to new atrocities either by the
military or the local combatants. Then the cycle begins again.
Let us look more closely at this cycle of
escalation-atrocity-deescalation-atrocity-reescalation. In Aceh, there
was a deescalation in August 1998 when President Habibie ordered the
withdrawal of external troops. In the months that followed, the
remaining troops committed a series of massacres, perhaps to impress
upon the Acehnese that the withdrawal did not signal a weakening of the
military�s resolve. The Bantaqiah massacre of July 1999, in which
soldiers shot and killed 71 civilians, was the most brazen atrocity
during this wave of repression. The reescalation was not immediate.
President Wahid attempted to prevent the military from reescalating but
he was finally forced to back down.
The reescalation in Aceh began with the creation
of a new Operations Implementation Command (Komando Pelaksanaan
Operasi, abbreviated Kolakops) in early 2001. Deployments of external
troops began soaring. The military elite viewed the creation of
Kolakops as a necessary means of ensuring that there was a single chain
of command to oversee both the territorial military apparatus and
external troops. A year later Kolakops was replaced by the Iskandar
Muda Regional Military Command.
The same cycle can be seen in Ambon. After the
first outbreak of violence in early 1999, the government began sending
large numbers of external troops there. To deal with the incoming
troops, the military reestablished the Pattimura Regional Military
Command in May 1999. Its task was to coordinate the activities of the
territorial military units and the increasing number of external
troops. After a number of atrocities, the army in 2001 reduced the
number of battalions from Kostrad and East Java which were seen to be
siding with the Muslim population. But this change in troop deployments
did not reduce the conflict. The separatist organisation, the Republik
Maluku Selatan (RMS), issued a militant declaration in early 2002 which
led to a new massacre of civilians. And so, as was the case in Aceh,
the military responded by sending more troops and establishing yet
another command, the Restoration of Security Operation Command (Komando
Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan).
Strangely, the majority of battalions deployed to
Ambon over the past two years have been artillery, engineering, and
cavalry battalions, rather than regular infantry battalions. According
to sources in Ambon, these battalions have been utilised because the
army is short-handed. These units resent being posted as peace-keepers,
something for which they were not trained. But that does not mean that
they have neglected their own specialisations: sources report that both
the Christian and Muslim communities have gained much of their
expertise in assembling bombs and weapons from the artillery units on
duty in Ambon.
As for Papua, the cycle has not yet run its full
course there. While the first several stages have been evident in
Papua, the military has thus far not sought to reescalate. Perhaps the
generals in Jakarta fear that any attempt to assert centralised
military control over Papua would result in increased tensions between
the well-entrenched Special Forces and non-organic or Kostrad units.
This trajectory of
escalation-atrocity-deescalation-atrocity-reescalation in Aceh, Ambon,
and Papua is all too reminiscent of the last decade of Indonesian rule
in East Timor. Lacking alternative means for resolving the root causes
of conflict, military deescalation invariably leads to new atrocities
by either the military or the local insurgents. The subsequent renewal
of violence only seems to confirm the view � one held not only by the
military but also by many civilian elites � that the military is the
only institution capable of containing violence, and hence of
preserving Indonesian unity. And thus escalation begins once again.
Civil-military relations
The steady rise in military deployments within
Indonesia since May 1998 has led many observers to conclude that the
military has new designs on political power. It is undoubtedly true
that the military is in a stronger political position today than at any
time over the past two decades (including the late Suharto era!), but
this does not necessarily mean that the military is scheming to seize
state power.
Rather, the dramatic increase in troop deployments
reflects the failure of civilian elites to assert their supremacy over
the military and to offer non-military solutions to the country�s
pressing regional problems. The civilian elites have been relying on
the military to find solutions to the conflicts in Aceh, Papua, Ambon,
and Poso. But passing the buck will not end the violence.
Inside Indonesia 73: Jan-Mar 2003
|