The collapse of the peace process has seen Aceh return to a cycle of violence
Michelle Ann Miller
The declaration of martial law in Aceh on 18 May 2003 unravelled all
progress that had been made during three years of peace talks between
Jakarta and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement). A
Joint Council Meeting between the two sides on 17�18 May in Tokyo
failed to agree on revisions to the implementation of the Cessation of
Hostilities [Framework] Agreement (CoHA) that was signed on 9 December
2002. This resulted in President Megawati Sukarnoputri issuing
Presidential Decree No. 28 of 2003, which imposed military emergency
status.
The collapse of the peace process has seen Aceh return to a cycle of
violence that began escalating in 1989 when the troubled province was
first subjected to martial law. This emergency status was lifted in
August 1998. Since then, the problems which initially gave rise to
calls for independence, such as grave human rights violations,
socio-economic inequities and demands for justice, have persisted. The
Indonesian state infrastructure in Aceh has visibly deteriorated, with
more than 13,000 buildings destroyed since 1999. At least 850 schools
have been incinerated by unknown arsonists and more than 135 teachers
have become victims of violence, disrupting the education of tens of
thousands of students. Most courts have been rendered inoperable, being
served by only 20 per cent of Aceh�s normal contingent of 126 judges.
Poverty levels have risen dramatically. From an estimated 890,000
Acehnese living below the poverty line in 1999, about 60 per cent of
Aceh�s 4.2 million population, or 2,500,000 people, were living in
poverty by early 2003. Unemployment has risen from approximately 30 per
cent of the labour force in 2001 to 40 per cent in 2003. Less than half
the province has access to safe drinking water and electricity. Health
levels, which strongly correlate with poverty, are significantly worse
amongst the poor in Aceh than in other Indonesian provinces due to
inadequate access to health centres and medical treatment. The number
of internally displaced people (IDPs) has fluctuated significantly
depending on the intensity of security operations. In April 2003, there
were 20,238 registered IDPs in Aceh. Following the imposition of
martial law, this number was expected to skyrocket after the government
announced plans to evacuate up to 200,000 civilians from the worst
conflict areas.
Even amidst the prolonged suffering of Acehnese society, hopes for
stability and security in Aceh�s future continued while the peace
process remained alive. From the start of the internationally
facilitated negotiations between Jakarta and GAM in late 1999, small
successes were achieved that brought periods of relative peace to Aceh.
There were also considerable setbacks as deep mistrust and fundamental
differences between the two sides frequently resulted in outbreaks of
war. Throughout the uncertain and difficult peace process, neither
party shifted from its end goal. The government remained committed to
its objective of upholding Aceh�s place within the territorial
boundaries of the Indonesian unitary state. GAM remained equally
determined to �liberate� the Acehnese from �Javanese neo-colonialism�
by establishing an independent Aceh sultanate. At least while peaceful
negotiations continued, however, so did the potential for non-violent
compromises to eventually be made.
The imposition of martial law has also involved a shift of emphasis
in the Indonesian government�s Aceh strategy. Previously, its stated
policy priority was implementing �special autonomy� in Aceh. In August
2002, President Megawati described the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)
legislation (Law No.18/2001), that was ratified by the national
parliament on 19 July 2001, as �the main pillar for conflict
resolution� in Aceh. The so-called NAD law aimed to create an
attractive alternative to secession by granting the Acehnese greater
self-governance and an increased share of their natural resource
revenue. The three major tenets of this legislation include the return
of 70 per cent of Aceh�s oil and gas revenues for eight years, the
imposition of aspects of Syari�ah (Islamic) law and direct
democratic local elections from 2005. In reality, however, few efforts
have so far been made to implement this political strategy. Instead,
the government�s primary Aceh policy focus has been military operations
aimed at forcing GAM to accept special autonomy as a precursor to
peace. The main beneficiaries of Aceh�s new revenue sharing
arrangements have been a handful of local and national politicians, and
elements within the Indonesian security apparatus. GAM has also
benefited by imposing �war taxes� on businesses, government officials
and the local population. In two separate Indonesian studies Aceh has
been labelled the �most corrupt� province in the archipelago.
The Megawati administration hopes that if it can eliminate GAM
militarily, then Acehnese society will accept special autonomy as a
lasting political solution to the conflict. Since January 1999,
however, at least 12 separate security operations have been conducted
in Aceh, which have neither curbed secessionist demands nor facilitated
the restoration of law and order. The imposition of martial law has
made Aceh�s prospects for peace even more remote. Under these
conditions, any short to medium term autonomy initiatives to improve
the lives of ordinary Acehnese are unlikely to succeed.
Michelle Ann Miller is completing a PhD on Aceh at Northern Territory University. She can be contacted at Michelle.Miller@ntu.edu.au