Reform of the security sector is fundamental for achieving a democratic Indonesia
Riefqi Muna
Under the umbrella of the ‘war on terror’, the White House has gained
Congressional approval to remove some of the restrictions on
military-to-military relations between America and Indonesia. At
present, American support for Indonesia’s military is still limited to
Extended International Military Education and Training, which allows
Indonesian military officers to attend American military educational
institutions at select regional centres for non-lethal training.
When Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Indonesia in August 2002,
it was reported that the White House was requesting Congressional
approval for US$50 million in security assistance to Indonesia, half of
which was to be channelled into the police force. This shift in
American policy toward reinstating military relations with Indonesia
significantly changes the dynamics of US-Indonesian ties. While there
are other influences and forces at play, there is undoubtedly a
connection between military reform in Indonesia and the greater global
context in which it is taking place.
Global policy shift
The Bush administration has replaced Clinton’s ‘enlargement and
engagement of liberal democracy’ approach to ensuring global stability
with a new strategy of ‘pre-emption’ and uni-lateralism in which all
states are forced to choose to be ‘with us or witä the terrorists’.
This strategy was reinforced by the creation of the Homeland Security
Department, which resulted in a more robust American security
organisation capable of carrying out greater offensive security
strategies.
America’s new security approach is narrowly focused on the hunt for
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, the search for weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, and the uprooting of the ‘tentacle of terror’ —
Jama’ah Islamiyah — in Southeast Asia. This is despite the obvious fact
that the issue of terrorism is far more complex than this tactic
suggests, and is intricately bound up in global and domestic political,
economic, security and other issues.
Reviving conservatives
In Indonesia, the catchcry of reformasi is rarely heard any
more, and the state’s commitment to policy reform is all but dead. The
incumbent Megawati government lacks leadership and vision. Despite
praise for her cabinet when she first came to power, Megawati appears
to have adopted a ‘no policy’ stance, especially in the area of reform
of Indonesia’s security apparatus. Yet reform of the security sector is
fundamental for achieving a democratic Indonesia.
Reform of Indonesia’s security forces thus far has been limited to
firstly, the separation of the police from the armed forces, and
secondly, an end to military involvement in ‘day-to-day politics’ by
discharging serving military officers from civilian posts. This
occurred in August 2002, when the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)
agreed to scrap the military’s and police’s automatic seats in both the
MRP and the House by 2004. Should military and police officers want to
join the legislative bodies, they have to contest in general elections,
for which they have to resign from the service. Thirdly, the security
forces held a relatively neutral position during the 1999 national
elections. Little if any other reform of the security forces has been
achieved.
The old security doctrines developed by 1950s army commander General
Nasution remain deeply rooted in Indonesian military strategy and
thinking. These doctrines include the notion of the ‘dual function’,
whereby the military plays a political as well as an internal security
role, and strategic reliance on ‘counter-guerrilla’ actions, by which
the military is supposed to remain deeply embedded in the civilian
population. More than two thirds of the army’s elite were trained and
nurtured in the army’s territorial system, which parallels civilian
posts at every level in every province. There has been little change in
this system, or in the curriculum of new defence force recruits. To
make matters worse, elite civilian politicians still perceive the
military in terms of political power, and not as an element of the
state that serves civilian needs.
Reform of the security apparatus and promotion of human rights are
integral to broader reform in Indonesia. Both have suffered because of
the Indonesian elite’s struggle to cling to traditional methods of
power. Poverty of vision and a lack of will to implement strategic
reforms continue under a corrupt bureaucracy and a stubborn political
elite that are power hungry, greedy, and forgetful of its constituents.
Add the effect of the global context, in which security discourse has
been pre-eminent, and we see reform of the security forces being
undermined by an anti-reformist group taking advantage of the rhetoric
of national interest and global security to serve its own ends. This
nexus is evident in several critical ways.
Shock and awe
Firstly, there is much less focus on issues of democracy and human
rights than in the years immediately following the downfall of the
Suharto regime. The global ‘war on terrorism’ has crippled rigorous
debate on matters of civil liberties world-wide. Emphasis lies heavily
on security. Renewed military ties between Australia, the US and
Indonesia have caused great concern among Indonesian pro-democracy
activists that the military will continue to act with impunity, and
that the Australian and American governments will strive to legitimise
re-engagement rather than condemn military human rights violations.
Training and enhanced professionalism (the reason these Western
governments usually give for engagement) is indeed essential. However,
the legitimatioĊ½ of an unreformed and unrepentant military is
counter-productive to the promotion of democratic control over the
armed forces in Indonesia.
Nowhere is this emphasis more evident than in the current ‘security
operations’ in Aceh. Within the global context of the ‘war on
terrorism’, proponents of military operations in Aceh have used
neo-conservative security rhetoric to win international legitimacy.
Military officers surrounding Megawati have labelled the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) a terrorist group, against which pre-emptive and
unilateral strikes, like the US ‘shock and awe’ campaign in Iraq, are
justified. This is despite ample historical evidence that military
operations in Aceh cannot solve the secessionist problem and will not
guarantee the unity of the Indonesian state.
Security legislation
There has been political interference in, and military domination of,
the development of security legislation in Indonesia. Democratic states
obviously can and should regulate security matters to ensure the
protection of their people. However, the way in which such legislation
has been formulated in Indonesia in recent times has tended to violate
the principles of human rights and due legal process.
This was evident in the recent controversy surrounding the drafting of
the Bill on the Structure and Organisation of the Armed Forces. This
Bill, which was put to the Indonesian parliament in March 2003, seeks
authority for the TNI to declare a state of ýmergency and deploy
security personnel without prior approval from the president. The Bill
contradicts the newly amended constitution and the National Defence
Law, which stipulates that the president alone, in his or her capacity
as the supreme commander of military, has the authority to declare a
state of emergency and order the deployment of troops to conflict-torn
areas. The president is required to secure prior approval from the
House of Representatives (DPR) or report the decision to the House
within 24 hours.
In the interests of civilianisation and democratisation of the armed
forces, the drafting of new defence force legislation was supposed to
entail transparent and consultative processes. However, as was widely
reported in the Indonesian media, the final Bill was the result of an
undemocratic usurpation of the drafting process, using classic army
strong-arm tactics. Civilian experts involved in the original drafting
process openly rejected the resulting Bill, because it does not
accommodate democratic values and principles of accountability. This is
evident in Article 19, which states that: ‘the Chief of Defence can
deploy troops without permission from the president (civil authority).’
There are many other problems with the new security Bill, particularly
surrounding the issues of military budgeting and auditing, reform of
which was rejected by the military.
The Indonesian military elite has used the priority of national
security and unity to thwart reform of the territorial command
structure. This structure allows the Indonesian military to generate up
to 75 per cent of its own budget by controlling legal and illegal
business operations at the local level. The success of this system is
hinged on the fact that the armed forces are not geographically
structured to defend the archipelagic nation, but to mirror the
civilian administrative structure. They have defence posts shadowing
each level of civilian administration, from the smallest village up to
the national level. This structure will not produce an Indonesian
defence system capable of defending the nation.
There is undoubtedly a correlation between the resurgence of
neo-conservatism in the US and the slowing down of security sector
reform in Indonesia. The new US security agenda sends dangerous signals
for the future direction of Indonesian democracy, and especially for
the potential for military intervention in the political process. When
considering renewed military ties, the US, Australia and others should
pay attention to the issues of security sector reform rather than
simply the military’s ability to combat terrorism.
Both the global and local political contexts have proved to be
stumbling blocks for security sector reform in Indonesia. International
support is needed to promote reform, as are national leaders with
vision and courage.
Riefqi Muna (Riefqi@Runbox.com)
is a PhD student at the Royal Military College of Science, UK, and
works with Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (www.gfn-ssr.org).
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